


IS CURRENT US COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
APPLICABLE TO LEBANESE HIZBALLAH
AND THE TALIBAN?



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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or the Department of Defense or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IS CURRENT US COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE APPLICABLE TO LEBANESE HIZBALLAH AND THE TALIBAN? By Sean P. Carlson, 138 Pages.

This thesis explores the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine in Joint Publication 3-24, Field Manual 3-24 and Field Manual 3-24.2 to the Lebanese Hizballah and Taliban insurgencies. In particular, this thesis examines the Cold War operational environment which influenced the writings of Mao Tse Tung, David Galula and Bard O'Neill and contrasts that to the current operational environment in which Lebanese Hizballah and the Taliban operate. Additionally, the thesis explores the historical evolution of Hizballah and the Taliban and the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine to these two groups. In both case studies the applicability of current doctrine is mixed as doctrine downplays the role of religion and relies upon Maoist insurgency phasing to describe Hizballah and Taliban insurgency evolution. This is especially misleading with regard to how Hizballah converted itself into a major political party.

The thesis concludes insurgency doctrine needs to be updated to reflect the current operational environment and recommends expanding the foreign area officer program, reexamining the Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan conflicts to guide counterinsurgency doctrinal development. By implementing these recommendations, senior US Army commanders will improve their ability to conduct Battle Command in counterinsurgency environments.

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ACRONYMS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FM	Field Manual
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
JP	Joint Publication
JUI	Jamaat-e-Islami
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SLA	Army of Southern Lebanon

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

For the last eight years the United States has been involved in global counterinsurgency operations with a specific focus on insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both conflicts the US military has often struggled to understand the nature of the conflict, the motivations of our opponents and the tactics employed by insurgents. This lack of understanding led to a significant decline in the security environment in Iraq in 2006 and has contributed to the current lack of stability in Afghanistan.

In 2005, the US Army and Marine Corps published Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 which sought to define insurgency and develop a counterinsurgency doctrine for the US military which could be applied to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The document is influenced by Cold War theory and case studies to define an insurgency and its desired end-state. This reliance made it difficult to adequately characterize the type of enemies faced in Iraq as very few of our opponents fit the narrow definition of insurgency within FM 3-24 and had motivations that varied from those of which occurred during the Cold War.

Primary Research Questions

The first primary question for the thesis focuses on whether or not current US counterinsurgency doctrine is an accurate reflection of Islamist insurgencies, primarily the threat posed by Lebanese Hizballah and the Taliban. The follow-on primary question

is: "What is the origin and evolution of Lebanese Hizballah and the Taliban and how do they compare to current US insurgency doctrine?"

Secondary Research Questions

The secondary research questions derived from the first research questions are: what theories and historical case studies form the basis for our understanding of insurgency, what was the operational environment when these theories were derived from the case studies, and what has changed since these theories were developed?

Significance

This study of the theories and writings which have guided the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine and its application to modern conflicts provides a basis for validating whether these theoretical underpinnings remain relevant to the current operational environment. Most insurgency theorists have written that not all insurgencies are the same, yet US counterinsurgency doctrine relies upon Marxist insurgencies throughout the Cold War with some updating to reflect the on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additional study of Islamic insurgencies provides additional insights which can help guide the development of strategies to support future stability operations in the Middle East and against criminal and non-governmental organizations.

Assumptions

The first major assumption is that current counterinsurgency writings rely heavily upon theories and historical case studies from the Cold War and does not account for the nature of current insurgencies.

Definitions

Insurgency: A protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying force, or other political authority while increasing insurgency control (FM 3-24).

Subversion: (DOD) Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare (DOD Dictionary of Military Terms).

Terrorism: (DOD) The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; counterterrorism; force protection condition; terrorist; terrorist groups (DOD Dictionary of Military Terms).

Limitations

This study is limited to English sources only, and limited by a large volume of data on insurgency and these historical case studies, inherent author biases in writings on the selected historical case studies, and a compressed amount of time to research and author the thesis. The author also uses recently declassified US and allied intelligence and diplomatic reporting, some of which remains redacted and is deemed to be intelligence which is suitable for release to the general public. The large volume of scholarship on insurgency since 11 September 2001 is a complicating factor as it has increased the amount of data on insurgency and made it more difficult to find quality work on the topic.

Lebanese Hizballah and the Taliban are controversial topics and have a significant number of secondary sources with pronounced biases on the organizations. This limiting factor when combined with the compressed timeline to complete the thesis is likely to limit the scope of research conducted in support of this thesis.

Primary Sources

The examination of historic and current doctrine relies upon primary source documents on the nature of insurgency as the author relies upon the published texts of Mao Tse Tung, David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Bard O'Neill and Joint Publication 3-24 and Field Manuals 3-24 and 3-24.2. Rather than rely upon secondary sources and their analysis of current doctrine, the author has chosen to analyze the doctrine and apply those concepts to the Hizballah and Taliban case studies to assess the applicability of current doctrine.

Most primary documents related to Hizballah and the Taliban remain classified and limit the availability of US government documents on these groups. Because of these restrictions, the majority of primary source material related to the Hizballah and Taliban case studies is US diplomatic reporting which has historically retained lower classification levels than US intelligence reporting. The Hizballah case study incorporates primary source material comprised of declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessments of Hizballah with some limited declassified reporting from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. Other primary sources used in the thesis are first-hand newspaper accounts from Lebanon and translated Hizballah political manifestos from 1985 and 2009.

The Taliban case study primary source documents are primarily US diplomatic reporting from Kabul from 1979 to 1988 as well as diplomatic reporting from Islamabad from the 1980s through 11 September 2001. US Embassy reporting from Islamabad during the 1990s provides the majority of primary source material on the Taliban emergence and conditions within Afghanistan from 1992 through 2001. Limited CIA assessments of the Taliban have been declassified and provide additional insights into Taliban development and activities during the 1990s. Newspapers and magazine articles on Afghanistan in the early 1990s provide an additional primary source of information.

Secondary Sources

The secondary sources for the Hizballah case study are primarily scholarly works on the rise of the Shi'a nationalism in Lebanon as well as political science studies of Hizballah. Joseph Alagha's *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology: Religious ideology, Political ideology and Political program* provides a useful examination of Hizballah's evolution from the early 1980s through the present day. Alagha's work contains significant pro-Hizballah bias but is still an academic work which provides insights into Hizballah's point of view. An additional source of significant information for the Hizballah chapter is contained in Fouad Ajami's *The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon*. Ajami's *The Vanished Imam* is one of the more authoritative works on the Shi'a revival in Lebanon and is cited in most academic works on Hizballah. Eitan Azani's book, *Hizballah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization* provides significant insights into the Israeli perspective towards Hizballah and their evolution from terrorists to an insurgency capable of challenging Israeli influence.

The most authoritative secondary source used in the Taliban case study is Stephen Coll's book, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to 10 September 2001*. Coll had significant access to CIA reporting on Afghanistan and conducted many in-depth interviews with current and retired agency officers to describe the operational environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the late 1970s through 10 September 2001. Another incredibly useful secondary source cited in Chapter 4 is Ahmed Rashid's book, *Descent Into Chaos*, which discusses the US government failures to secure Afghanistan after 11 September. Rashid has significant access to Pakistani government and Taliban military officials and provides valuable context to press reporting on the Afghan conflict. Neamatollah Nojumi's book, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, is heavily influenced by his Afghan background and gives that perspective on the Soviet invasion and the emergence of the Taliban.

CHAPTER 2

SHAPERS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Cold War Operational Environment Influencing Early Doctrine

The Cold War was a global struggle between non-communist and communist governments for influence within newly independent states which had formerly served as British, French, Dutch and Portuguese colonies. This struggle created an environment in which insurgencies could flourish as they could expect a fair degree of external support for their operations. Additionally, the gradual decline of the Western European powers encouraged the growth of national liberation movements which sought to assert independence from their former colonial powers. Many of these liberation movements were receptive to communist propaganda which portrayed the Soviet Union, China and Cuba as sympathetic to the newly independent countries in Africa, South America and Asia.

World War II proved to be the downfall of the major European colonial powers as they suffered substantial economic and military setbacks. In many cases, the European powers lost any control of their Asian colonies to Japanese invasion, creating nearly four years in which colonial control was undermined. Many of these colonies had anti-Japanese resistance movements which were supported by Allied intelligence services during the war, consequently, these resistance movements became the basis for insurgencies against colonial rule following World War II. For example, US intelligence support to Vietnamese insurgents helped facilitate the development of Ho Chi Minh's communist insurgency against the French government. Allied support to anti-Japanese

resistance operations in the Philippines helped the development of a communist insurgency against the Filipino government in the late 1940s as the US military provided external support to communist insurgents fighting the Japanese.

A significant feature of the Cold War operational environment was the reality that conventional war between the US and its European allies and the Soviet Union and its satellite states had the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict. Both the US and Soviet governments planned to use nuclear weapons in conventional warfare, creating an operational environment in which neither side wanted to initiate a conventional war. To counter the US and its allies, the Soviets provided significant military, economic, and political support to emergent insurgencies throughout the developing world as a means to maintain pressure on the West without provoking a conventional conflict. Soviet support was often an enabler of wars of national liberation, however, it was not the driving force behind these operations as many of these movements had legitimate aspirations for independence. Some examples of this support include: intelligence support and training to Cuban insurgents during the 1950s, military support to the Vietnamese and Vietcong during the 1960s, and military support to Angolan insurgents in the early 1970s. For this reason, early counterinsurgency theorists believed that most insurgencies were heavily influenced by communist ideology and dominated by Soviet support. This belief is directly reflected in many of their writings on insurgency.

Mao Transforms Insurgency by Codifying Population Centric-Warfare

The Chinese communist insurgency against the Japanese occupation and the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1940s is often cited as the first

example of a modern insurgency. Prior to the Chinese Communists, many insurgencies were perceived by Western observers as primarily partisan movements, auxiliary forces intended to serve as a supporting element of a conventional military struggle between two nation-states.¹ Mao used guerrilla warfare in conjunction with indigenously developed conventional military force against the Japanese occupation and later the Nationalist Chinese government was viewed by many in the West as a significant departure from traditional partisan warfare. His book, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, codified a framework which insurgents could develop and overthrow legitimate governments without the direct military involvement of an external state in the conflict.

The Chinese communist insurgency during the 1930s and 1940s was primarily motivated by a desire for large-scale political and socio-economic reform. These motivations heavily influenced Mao's writings as he explicitly refers to his revolution as seeking the emancipation of the Chinese people from their subjugation at the hands of the Japanese.² His desire to expel the Japanese occupier and later remove the Chinese Nationalist government from power is reflected in his description of insurgency phasing. The most likely path of success for the Chinese communist insurgency was to gradually progress along the three phases described by Mao and to culminate in the overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist government. It is also worth noting that Mao cautions his readers that his description of insurgency is directly related to the situation and China and may not be relevant in all situations.

¹John Shy, *Makers of Modern Strategy, From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986), 829.

²Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, DC, Headquarters US Marine Corps,), 41.

In his book, Mao states that insurgents should link their political goals and military actions to achieve their desired endstate. He unambiguously states that an insurgency requires clearly defined political goals and that it is not separated from national policy but done in accordance with that policy and must coincide with the will of the people. Mao writes that it is important for all elements of the insurgency to understand the nature of the conflict and its political goals and responsibility and for the insurgency to articulate these goals to the local populace. As a subset of this belief in the necessity for the public to understand the nature of the insurgency, he writes the insurgent cannot survive without the will of the people.

Mao's writing on insurgency focuses on the concept of a protracted conflict, i.e. extending the timeline of the conflict to wear down an opponent and to avoid losing critical strength during the conflict.³ To support this point he writes that insurgents should refrain from large-scale battles in the early stages of the conflict as their resources are limited and they cannot afford to lose their military. The idea of protracting a conflict is also designed to build support among the local populace to support their political program and shift support from the enemy of the insurgent. Mao appears to understand that Western counterinsurgents, for example the French, British and US, are unwilling to engage in prolonged conflicts and that the counterinsurgent will often grow tired of the conflict and eventually acquiesce to the insurgent. Despite his caution against large-scale conventional battles between the guerrillas and the counterinsurgents, he argues the revolutionary should seek decisive engagements when they favor the insurgent and can lead to additional support for the insurgency.

³Ibid., 42.

Mao argues insurgencies evolve through three phases in pursuit of their desired endstate which is the overthrow of the government. The first phase that Mao describes is the clandestine development of a political party and operating area, usually conducted in a manner that is consistent with the laws of the country to prevent the government from disrupting the insurgent's organization. In this phase, Mao describes an insurgency which is largely building a base of support and engaged in very limited military activity. This recruitment activity continues throughout the insurgency, even after the subsequent phrases begin. The second insurgency phase is comprised of guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorisms designed to weaken the control of the state and increase the insurgents influence and control over the population. An added benefit of the second phase of insurgent activity is that it allows the insurgent to build its military strength relative to the government while avoiding decisive confrontations. Following the development of a strong military component, Mao writes, the insurgency will evolve and conduct conventional military operations against the government with goal of overthrowing the government. These types of operations are not meant to be mutually exclusive, i.e. the guerrilla activity weakens counterinsurgent resolve to support conventional insurgent operations, while the traditional insurgent operations create a more permissive environment for guerrilla activity. In fact, Mao argues that the guerrilla cannot be divorced from "regular forces" of the resistance and that they will remain linked throughout the course of the insurgent campaign.⁴

⁴Ibid., 55.

David Galula Assesses Lessons Learned in French Defeat in Algeria and Vietnam

David Galula was one of the first theorists to provide warning on the types of conflict which were likely to confront the West during the Cold War. Galula's role as the French military attaché to China in the late 1940s and his brief captivity as a prisoner of the Chinese communists provided him insights into Maoist insurgency and its implications for Western governments in the developing world.⁵ His observations on the nature of the Chinese communist insurgency and his subsequent service in French counterinsurgency operations in Algeria form the basis for many of his observations in his widely quoted book on insurgency titled: *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. Galula's writings on the nature of insurgency would become the framework through which Westerners would understand insurgency throughout much of the Cold War.

Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice provides analysis of the Chinese communist insurgency in the late 1940s as well as the Algerian insurgency against the French colonial government in the 1950s. Galula notes that insurgency is a political war and states that the insurgent's military capability is often subordinate to his political organization.⁶ He elaborates on this point and states that the population is the ultimate center of gravity in an insurgency as both the insurgent and counterinsurgent are fighting for the support of the populace.⁷ Without the support of the populace, the insurgent is

⁵David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Praeger, 1964), 9.

⁶Ibid., 8.

⁷Ibid., 7-8.

likely to be unsuccessful in an insurgency. He uses the case study of the Greek civil war and notes that the Greek communists lacked effective support from the local populace, ultimately leading to the Greek communist lack of success. Additionally, Galula notes insurgent political operations are important to the conduct of their operations and in successful insurrections they support the conduct of military operations.

A second point that Galula stresses is that an insurgency is ultimately a protracted struggle and that insurgents require time to build support and forces to fight the counterinsurgents.⁸ To support this argument, Galula points out that many insurrections begin long before the initiation of overt military activity. Galula calls these pre-conflict preparations “cold revolutionary war” because the insurgent is building his clandestine political organization and popular support within established legal frameworks within the targeted country. The insurrections that Galula had first-hand experience with were protracted struggles by the insurgent against established counterinsurgents.

Galula also discusses in detail how insurrections evolve from clandestine political organizations to traditional military organizations capable of confronting the counterinsurgent within an insurgency. This evolution is done to facilitate increased infiltration of the insurgent and to increase subversion of the state and to enable the insurgent to promote order and civil society as a means to de-legitimize the state. Galula explains the evolution of insurgency as occurring in five phases:

1. Create clandestine political party to establish popular support for movement
2. United front
3. Guerrilla warfare to gain support of the populace and demoralize

⁸Ibid., 4-5.

counterinsurgent to create more permissive operating environment. This activity is done to expand an insurgent freedom of movement, insurgents will leave stay-behind forces to consolidate control, develop secure bases and rear areas

4. Movement warfare by the insurgent, to harass and pin-down counterinsurgent further
5. Insurgent offensive to overthrow the state.⁹

According to Galula, the insurgent will progress along these steps and can move between them as the security environment dictates and that an insurgency within a country can have forces operating along all elements of the spectrum, an idea that he likely observed in practice in China in the late 1940s.

Another significant emphasis of Galula is the importance of external support to an insurgency and the impact it has upon an insurgent. Galula stresses that external support is often a pre-requisite for successful insurgencies and he later states he believes that insurgents eventually require external support to succeed. To support this thesis, Galula examines the Greek communist insurgency and how the loss of its safe-haven and support from the Yugoslav government undermined its ability to continue fighting the Greek government in the late 1940s. He also notes that external support can provide moral, political, technical, financial and military support to the insurgency and increase its capacity to fight the counterinsurgent.¹⁰ Galula appears to believe that external support

⁹Ibid., 45-47.

¹⁰Ibid., 39.

is not required for the emergence of an insurgency but almost all successful insurgencies receive significant external support.

Trinquier Argues Insurgency is Struggle For Control of Populace

Roger Trinquier's experiences with insurgency were in French Indochina during the early 1950s and in Algeria in the mid to late 1950s. These experiences appear to have led him to conclude that an insurgency conflict was fundamentally a competition for control of the populace and that the counterinsurgent and insurgent needed to use whatever means were necessary to gain the support of the populace. The French used torture to gain information as part of their counterinsurgency strategy, and the linkage of Trinquier to this policy has unfortunately tarnished his reputation. Despite this, *A French View of Modern Warfare* is a useful analysis of insurgency which provides insights which remain relevant to the current study of insurgency.

A significant aspect of Trinquier's work on the nature of insurgency is his focus on the insurgent's use of terrorism to gain support from the local populace. He notes that the insurgent will use terrorism to compel the local populace to support the insurgency out of self-preservation.¹¹ The insurgent's indiscriminate use of terror is difficult for the counterinsurgent to counter and instills fear within the populace while delegitimizing the government. Trinquier also states counterinsurgency operations "timidly conducted with inadequate resources will fail miserably and encourage others to join the insurgency." The insurgent also uses terrorism to limit the ability of the counterinsurgent to operate

¹¹Roger Trinquier, *A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London: Pall Mall Publishing, 1964), 5.

among the populace, isolating the counterinsurgent and creating a more permissive operating environment for the insurgency.

Trinquier notes in his book that insurgencies maintain a well-developed clandestine political structure which is designed to support the insurgent's operations. Oftentimes the clandestine organization begins its operations within the legal framework of the society, complicating efforts of the counterinsurgent to counter such operations and masking the true intent of the insurgent. This characterization is very similar to the cold revolutionary war described by David Galula in *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. The armed clandestine organization is seeking to impose its will upon the population, and many of its senior leaders are willing participants in the organization who were not recruited through fear or intimidation. Additionally, the seemingly random acts of violence conducted by the insurgents are actually tied into a larger strategic operation and should be considered as such by the counterinsurgent. Trinquier also states that this clandestine political organization provides the necessary logistical support to enable the insurgent to maintain his presence within society without fear of capture.

Another significant feature of *Modern Warfare* is Trinquier's belief that the insurgency will begin in rural areas which lack a strong counterinsurgent presence to build insurgent legitimacy through attacks against isolated and exposed counterinsurgents but later expand to urban areas.¹² He states that most insurgencies begin targeting low-level police and bureaucrats in these areas as a means to expand terror among the populace and to gain passive support. These low-level attacks are intended to force the counterinsurgent to retreat into more defensible positions, creating a more permissive

¹²Ibid., 100.

environment for the insurgent. Following insurgent consolidation of control in the countryside, the insurgent is likely to spread his campaign to the urban areas and increasingly conduct operations across expanded areas of operation. Trinquier suggests that a combined rural/urban insurgency would be a major threat to stability and very difficult for the counterinsurgent to defeat.

Trinquier is consistent with Mao and Galula in the belief that guerrilla warfare and terrorism are one part of a revolutionary war evolution to a regular army to confront the counterinsurgent. The actions of the guerrilla are designed to create conditions in which the guerrilla can evolve to a regular fighting force capable of confronting the counterinsurgent and the guerrilla will continue to function even when a regular army exists. He further states that he believes the insurgency campaign will culminate in a large decisive battle in which the insurgent seeks to defeat the counterinsurgent.

Mao, Galula and Trinquier all stress the importance of external support for an insurgency to succeed against the counterinsurgent. Trinquier discusses how an insurgent will seek to establish secure bases in neighboring countries to facilitate training and use it as a safe-haven to conduct operations into the targeted country. He states an insurgent safe haven in an external country will allow the insurgent to remain a viable threat despite the best efforts of the counterinsurgent to target the insurgent.¹³ Trinquier argues that the revolutionary movements which emerge in the new Cold War operational environment will receive support from the communists if the host government is non-communist and from the non-communists if the host government is communist.

¹³Ibid., 99.

RAND Counterinsurgency Symposium Guides US COIN Doctrine

In 1962 the US government commissioned the RAND Corporation to host a symposium on the nature of insurgency and successful counterinsurgency techniques to provide policy-makers increased insight prior to the US decision to increase its involvement in South Vietnam.¹⁴ The participants in the symposium possessed a range of experience in counterinsurgency and were veterans of diverse conflicts such as resistance operations in the Philippines during World War II, British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, and French counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and Algeria (For a complete list of participants and their backgrounds please see Appendix A). From 16 to 20 April 1962, these theorists discussed the types of insurgency they had encountered, the characteristics of these insurgencies and the best practices they had employed against these adversaries.

The twelve theorists at the conference all agreed that the insurgent's aim was to control the populace, making military bases and terrain less decisive than in previous conflicts. David Galula argued that once an insurgency gained a strong foothold, terrain was not a decisive factor, instead the decisive factor was the density of a population in a given area.¹⁵ To support this thesis attendees stated an insurgent's political organization was a key to operations and necessary to keep operating in the field. Without the support of the populace the insurgency was often quickly marginalized and isolated from bases of support and easily neutralized by the counterinsurgent.

¹⁴RAND Corporation, *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20-1962*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2006.

¹⁵Ibid., 2, 8, 17.

The participants in the symposium had a heavy fixation on communist insurgency as almost every participant had been involved in the suppression of communist insurgencies in the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam and Algeria. This fixation, particularly upon the Maoist form, led them to conclude that insurgencies required a well-defined political organization and message to rally the populace and sustain their operations. The segment of the population most recruited by the Communists was inevitably students and intellectuals as they provided influential support. The theorists noted that the traditional/orthodox insurgency, which had been heavily influenced by Mao Tse Tung's writings on insurgency, often required a long buildup and a gradual progression along the three phases of insurgency and culminated in the overthrow of the counterinsurgent. The participants also observed that insurgent negotiations were often ruses to build leverage and time for the insurgent and cited Mao's negotiations with the Nationalist government in 1949 as a gambit to weaken Nationalist support for operations and to build leverage and time for a communist offensive into Nationalist strongholds.¹⁶

An interesting discussion and lesson learned from the symposium was the impact that external support can have upon an insurgency. Two of the symposium participants actively participated in anti-Japanese resistance operations from 1941 to 1945 and noted US military support to the resistance movement in the Philippines had a decisive role in sustaining the morale of the resistance. They stated external support, even when it was small shipments of weapons, sustained morale for the fighting force.¹⁷ Other participants, with experience in Algeria, asserted that the Algerian insurgency's loss of safe-havens

¹⁶Ibid., 58.

¹⁷Ibid., 26.

significantly contributed to a decline in insurgent morale as they could not flee French military operations. Additionally, the participants noted that external support from sympathetic foreign governments provided training and expertise to insurgents enabling them to increase their military and political capabilities and operate more effectively in targeting the counterinsurgent.

A significant focus of discussion for the symposium was the role of intelligence in an insurgency. The attendees agreed that an insurgency environment was a competition for intelligence, but that the insurgents required superior intelligence to the counterinsurgent during the conflict. Colonel Wendell Fertig, an American veteran of resistance operations against the Japanese, stated that he believed the resistance's success against the Japanese was directly related to the superior intelligence they were able to receive through their network of informants.¹⁸ He contrasted American and Filipino resistance fighters' access to intelligence with that of the Japanese Army who often suffered intelligence problems due to a lack of support from the local populace following Japanese heavy-handed actions against Filipinos in 1942 and 1943. Frank Kitson, a British veteran of counter-insurgency operations in Kenya, argued that successful insurgents often develop detailed intelligence on the strengths of the counterinsurgent prior to initiating conflict.¹⁹ Another observation of the conference participants was that communists were often far more astute at putting together net assessments of the counterinsurgent than the counterinsurgent was able to understand the insurgent.²⁰ The

¹⁸Ibid., 100.

¹⁹Ibid., 124.

²⁰Ibid., 67.

ability of the insurgent to have superior intelligence information is likely directly related to the relationship that the insurgent has with the populace and the insurgent's ability to subvert security forces targeting the insurgent.

Che Guevara Proposes Expansion of Revolution in Western Hemisphere

Ernesto “Che” Guevara was born into a middle-class Argentinian family in 1928. He spent the majority of his youth traveling South America observing stark economic differences between the landed elites and the poor farmers in the rural countryside of South America. These observations and his subsequent participation in Fidel Castro’s insurgency against the corrupt regime of President Fulgencio Batista in Cuba formed the basis of his views on insurgency. He recorded his observations in his book *Guerrilla Warfare* published in 1963. These experiences and observations led him to conclude that insurgencies did not require large-scale insurgent support of the populace prior to the advent of a “revolutionary struggle.”²¹ His belief that Latin America was ripe for revolution would eventually lead to his death in 1967 at the hands of the Bolivian military and US Special Forces during his abortive attempt to overthrow the Bolivian government.²²

Much of Che’s writings on guerrilla warfare focus on class struggles between the landed elites and the poor rural peasant class prevalent in Latin America. His writings are filled with long diatribes against the “Yankee” imperialism in the Americas and call for the revolutionary vanguard to rise up and expel the “imperialist” influence of the US.

²¹Ibid., 50.

²²Ibid., ix.

Another significant portion of his writing on insurgency resembles a tactical military Field Manual and addresses issues such as employment of automatic weapons and basic hygiene for use in the field.

Che's main thesis in *Guerrilla Warfare* is that the Cuban revolution of 1959 proved that an insurgent can create the conditions for the revolution with a small group of revolutionaries and forego the development of popular support for the insurgency. He states that a force of 30 to 50 guerrillas is sufficient to create the conditions for the populace to support an insurgency and cease supporting the government. To illustrate his thesis he relied on his experiences in the 1959 Cuban Revolution and conveniently ignores the widespread unpopularity of President Batista throughout the 1950s which contributed to his eventual exile in 1959. This argument deviates from traditional Marxist ideology which focused on the development of popular support for the communist "revolution" to overthrow the existing government hostile to global communism. Che's deviation caused significant ideological tensions within the Communist world and may have been a contributing factor to his eventual departure from Cuba in the mid 1960s.

Despite his deviation from some communist insurgency principles, Che still argued for insurgency progress along three phases, from an initial preparatory phase to guerrilla warfare until an eventual conventional fight.²³ He contended that guerrilla warfare often creates conditions where the counterinsurgent becomes so demoralized that it is easier to move into the third phase of an insurgency and begin conventional military campaigns. Furthermore, the revolutionary cannot hope for victory unless he forms a popular army to carry the fight to the cities and the conventional military. This leads to

²³Ibid., 160.

mobile warfare between the insurgent and counterinsurgent throughout the country, a situation which culminates in the insurgent defeating the government.

Guevara was also convinced by his studies throughout Latin America that many countries within the region were ripe for insurgency due to long-standing grievances of the poor populace over the state of land ownership.²⁴ In particular, he noted the rural populations of Latin America often suffered at the hands of a privileged elite that was distant from the populace and unwilling to address their needs. For that reason, he argued that the banner of an insurgency in these locations should be agrarian reform for the poor, disadvantaged farmer.²⁵ Additionally, the rural areas provided terrain which would be easier for the insurgent to take shelter in during the initial stages of the insurgency and provide a level of protection that was unavailable to an urban insurgent.²⁶

Bard O'Neill Provides Lessons Learned of Cold War Insurgencies

Bard O'Neill, a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, authored *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, a useful analysis of the nature of insurgency and terrorism from the Cold War through 2005. His work examines a breadth of insurgencies from Africa, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East and provides some valuable lessons learned and key characteristics of the nature of insurgency. These insights are particularly useful and

²⁴Ibid., 130.

²⁵Ibid., 72.

²⁶Ibid., 159.

relevant to the current analyst and policy-maker involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Insurgency and Terrorism, From Revolution to Apocalypse provides the analytical frameworks necessary to begin identifying insurgencies. For example, O'Neill discusses different types of insurgencies to include: anarchists with no clearly defined purpose, egalitarian insurgencies which seek to create a system similar to Marxists, traditionalists who seek to restore values and norms of the past, apocalyptic-utopian insurgencies, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist and commercialist insurgencies.²⁷ O'Neill also describes the challenges in identifying insurgencies which are: changing goals, conflicting goals, misleading rhetoric, ambiguous goals of the insurgent and the confusion of analysts on the ultimate and intermediate goals.²⁸ Many of these case studies explore derivations of communist insurgencies throughout the Cold War.

O'Neill's writings highlight the competition between the government and the insurgent for influence and control of the indigenous population in the conflict. He emphasizes the population-centric competition, in particular, the importance that insurgents place upon receiving passive support from the populace to conduct their activities free of interference from the counterinsurgent.²⁹ Passive support can be more important to the insurgent than active support as it provides the insurgent the population in which to operate and receive logistical support. O'Neill argues that a successful

²⁷Bard O'Neill. *From Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency and Terrorism* (Dulles, Virginia, Potomac Books, 2005), 19-27.

²⁸Ibid., 29-31.

²⁹Ibid., 93-95.

insurgency requires the support of university students and intellectuals to provide strategic vision. This helps the insurgency to evolve from a small band of fighters into a cohesive, large-scale organization capable of conducting coordinated operations throughout the targeted country.³⁰

An additional aspect of competition for control of the populace is O'Neill's thesis that a successful insurgency must create parallel governance in an effort to undermine the local populace's support for the host government.³¹ In this regard, O'Neill is consistent with the previous authors who have noted that the insurgencies' creation of "liberated" areas provides a visible message to the populace the insurgency has momentum and is capable of providing better services and protection than the host government. O'Neill cites the example of the Angolan insurgent organization UNITA and its parallel governance that was in many ways superior to the governance provided by the communist government in Luanda. A more modern example is Muqtada al-Sadr's creation of parallel governance in 2005 and 2006 in Shi'a areas of Iraq. This shadow government established domestic and international legitimacy and also drew recruits to the insurgent cause and convinced the local populace to move from passive to active support of the insurgency. Most parallel governance acts such as social services, taxation, etc occur within legal frameworks and are difficult to target by counterinsurgents, further adding to their legitimacy.

O'Neill acknowledges the importance external support plays in an insurgency and argues that insurgencies require external support to be successful. In particular, he notes

³⁰Ibid., 97.

³¹Ibid., 107.

that insurgencies during the Cold War often had the support of the Soviets, Chinese or eastern European Communist states if they were Marxist in origin while non-communist insurgencies often received aid from the United States, France, Great Britain or South Africa for the conduct of their insurgency. External support provides an insurgent a sanctuary from counterinsurgent targeting and bases in which to conduct training and educational programs for the development of military and political cadres to fight the counterinsurgent. Without external sanctuary few insurgencies are able to flourish and successfully target the counterinsurgent.³²

A Changing Operational Environment Necessitates Updated US Doctrine

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a strengthening Islamist threat throughout much of the Middle East and Asia created new threats to US strategic interests around the world. These three major events all contributed significantly to a different operational environment than had existed throughout much of the Cold War. Weak states could no longer count on political or military support from the US or Soviet Union. Similarly, the US and the USSR found it more difficult to restrain regional powers such as Iraq. In addition, advanced weapons systems were freely available on the global black market, and Islamic fundamentalists perceived that their victory over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan had set the stage for their targeting of Western influence throughout much of the Middle East. These changes fundamentally altered the threat the US military was likely to face around the world creating the conditions requiring an update to US counterinsurgency doctrine.

³²Ibid., 146.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a significant decline in foreign aid and military support that communist and non-communist governments were willing to provide to their former client states—an act which would undercut regime stability throughout many parts of Africa and parts of Asia. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union's intelligence arm, the KGB, cut its funding for client states and organizations throughout much of Africa and the Middle East. Similarly, the U.S government reduced funding for its client states and insurgent allies throughout much of Africa and Central Asia, including Afghanistan.³³ These budget cuts suddenly placed these countries in a quandary as they had come to rely on external support to suppress insurgencies and terrorists operating within their country. The weakening of these governments and organizations led to increased freedom of movement for new insurgencies to flourish and threaten US interests around the world.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led to weak governments in many former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, a situation which eased the ability of insurgents and weapons smugglers to move advanced weapons systems throughout much of the developing world. Countries such as the Ukraine and Bulgaria became virtual weapons bazaars in which weapons smugglers such as Viktor Bout could easily ship light weapons across Africa and parts of Central and Southeast Asia.³⁴ These weak governmental restrictions enabled groups like the Taliban to purchase advanced weapons

³³Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 9.

³⁴Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, *Merchant of Death: Money, Guns Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishers, 2008), 57.

systems without relying upon foreign governments and facilitated their increasingly aggressive military operations. Insurgents around the world were able to procure many light weapons systems without major challenges throughout much of the 1990s as the US and major Western European powers were unable or unwilling to prevent the movement of these weapons.

The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the perception that radical Islamists in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were effectively fighting the Israelis would embolden Islamic fundamentalists throughout much of the Middle East and Central and South Asia throughout the 1990s to the present day. Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID), Saudi Arabian intelligence and jihadist support to Afghan resistance operations in the 1980s created the environment in which radical Islamists could coalesce around as Al-Qaida, the successor organization to a series of radical support networks operating in Pakistan.³⁵ Al-Qaida soon emerged as an umbrella organization for many radical Sunni Islamists throughout the Middle East, Central, Southern Asia and Southeast Asia, Europe and North Africa.³⁶ Localized Islamist insurgents soon began working with groups such as Al-Qaida to increase their insurgent activities throughout much of Algeria, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Europe and Southeast Asia and they began targeting US and Western interests in these regions. These attacks included but were not limited to: an aggressive and violent civil war in Algeria, support to a Taliban overthrow of a transition government in Kabul,

³⁵Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 84.

³⁶Evan F. Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian* (Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers, 2004), 3.

attacks targeting US forces in Saudi Arabia in 1996, US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the attack against the USS *Cole* in 2000. These attacks would eventually culminate with the 11 September 2001, attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Field Manual 3-24 Published to Build New Doctrinal Framework for Insurgency

The US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq created an operating environment unfamiliar to many US military officers accustomed to conventional operations during the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm. The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the increasing operations and tempo of insurgent attacks throughout Iraq led the US Army and Marine Corps in 2005 and 2006 to write a new counterinsurgency manual. This manual was partly intended to change the operational mindset of the US Army which was comfortable with conducting conventional military operations as much as it was to provide a framework for the conduct of population-centric counterinsurgency operations. FM 3-24 defines the threat US forces are likely to face in insurgency environments.

FM 3-24 defines insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict.”³⁷ Additionally, it states that political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and that each side in the conflict aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. This thesis is consistent with the principles of the Cold War insurgency

³⁷US Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), 1-2.

theorists and is derived from many of the writings of these theorists. FM 3-24 also discusses the importance of political activity within an insurgency and agrees with historical theorists that military action is often subordinate to military operations in an insurgency.³⁸

A second major point within FM 3-24 is the discussion of the nature and desired end-state of various insurgencies US military forces are likely to face. The types of insurgencies described by the manual are consistent with Bard O’Neill’s work on the subject and include conspiratorial, military-focused, urban, protracted popular war, and identity focused insurgencies.³⁹ These types of insurgencies are described for counterinsurgency practitioners and further develop the nature of the conflict, an important development for intelligence professionals and planners involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the manual describes five categories of enemy forces present in an insurgency: the movement leadership, combatants, auxiliaries, political cadre, and the mass base.⁴⁰ By providing these descriptions the manual appears to be furnishing a means for military professionals to understand the role of enemy individuals within an insurgent organization.

The third and possibly the most important point within FM 3-24 is the assertion that insurgency is a population-centric conflict for influence within the host population. Insurgencies compete for support from the local populace and seek to mobilize the

³⁸Ibid., 1-24.

³⁹Ibid., 1-24-1-38.

⁴⁰Ibid., 1-11.

civilian populace to support their cause.⁴¹ This idea is consistent with the works of the historical theorists and is based upon their experiences with insurgency throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s. Tied into this thesis is the discussion on the phases of insurgency and how insurgencies will move from clandestine political organizations to guerrilla warfare and eventually to outright conflict to overthrow the government. The field manual specifically states that an insurgency will seek to create parallel governance to undermine the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent and lead to overthrow of the established government.

FM 3-24 also states that the dynamics of an insurgency are shaped by a series of common factors such as leadership, objectives, ideology and narratives, environment and geography, external support and sanctuaries, and phasing and timing.⁴² The description of these factors focuses on their impact upon the nature and conduct of an insurgency and lays out a series of issues which counterinsurgents must examine and understand in order to develop strategy to defeat the insurgent. Additionally, such factors can help determine the strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency and what can be effectively targeted to defeat the insurgency.

FM 3-24.2 Further Describes Insurgency for US Army

FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, is designed to provide Army commanders a practical guide on the nature and characteristics of insurgency so that they can more easily plan and conduct counterinsurgency as a component of Battle

⁴¹Ibid., 1-108.

⁴²Ibid., 1-69.

Command.⁴³ Prior to FM 3-24 and 3-24.2, many Army staffs struggled to effectively “Understand” and “Visualize” the threat present in the Iraq and Afghanistan operational environment. FM 3-24.2 provides many of the in-depth details on the state of insurgency necessary to understand the threat insurgency poses, its characteristics and vulnerabilities which can be exploited by the counterinsurgent. In addition to describing the threat, the manual also provides a discussion of the current operational environment and the impact globalization and other factors have upon the conduct of military operations world-wide. To better explain these factors, the manual discusses the role operational variables have upon defining the operational environment and how understanding the operational variables will improve a commanders understanding of the threat environment.⁴⁴ The manual also uses the same narrow definition for insurgency that is present within FM 3-24 and states that it is designed to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It also notes that an insurgent leadership’s willingness to use force is a key distinction from other groups which operate within a country.

FM 3-24.2 begins its discussion of insurgency by defining the operational environment the US military is likely to encounter around the world and the factors which have helped to make the current operational environment. The factors described in the manual are: population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, religious

⁴³US Army doctrine defines Battle Command as the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy and is often broke down into four phases known as: Understand, Visualize, Describe, and Direct.

⁴⁴Operation variables: Operational variables are broad aspects of the environment, both military and non-military that may differ from one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. They comprise the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time Factors.

fundamentalism (which is defined as the growing adherence to “radical interpretations” of religious doctrine, resource demands, climate change), and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These factors are critical components of the operational environment and when they are studied in conjunction with the operational variables, they are likely to help define the problem the insurgency poses for a tactical. A key distinction, however, is the discussion of how mission variables should also be examined to understand the operational environment.⁴⁵ FM 3-24.2 provides a tool for conducting an in-depth study of civil considerations which is commonly known as the acronym ASCOPE or: Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events. FM 3-24.2 asserts that analyzing ASCOPE helps a commander identify ways to isolate the insurgent from the populace.⁴⁶

FM 3-24.2 is consistent with FM 3-24 in its definition of insurgency and states that it is designed to force the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Despite this definition, the manual later remarks that insurgencies have one of three objectives: to overthrow a government and seize power, to expel occupiers or to create or maintain a region where there is little or no governmental control.⁴⁷ These objectives as written run counter to the definition provided at the beginning of the manual and create a lack of consistency that undermines the description of goal and desired endstate of insurgents. FM 3-24.2’s discussion of insurgent objectives

⁴⁵Mission Variables: Aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission such as: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations.

⁴⁶US Army Field Manual 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, April 2009, 1-1.

⁴⁷Ibid., 2-7.

is a useful examination of the insurgency and provides a breakdown of insurgent strategic, operational and tactical goals during the conduct of an operation. This addition is useful for helping the reader of FM 3-24.2 identify the motivations of insurgents operating at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the conflict.

Additional areas of congruency between FM 3-24.2 and FM 3-24 include their descriptions of the dynamics driving insurgencies, the five elements present within an insurgency, and the phasing of an insurgency. FM 3-24.2's consistency is useful as it categorizes the eight operational dynamics of an insurgency, but what is of added benefit is the additional information provided by the manual to guide staff officers conducting mission analysis of insurgency environments. Additionally, the use of similar categories to describe the human elements of an insurgency is useful, as it provides common language for Soldiers conducting mission analysis. The congruency between the two manuals over the phasing of an insurgency is of significant utility, identifying the insurgency phase will help determine the extent of the threat the counterinsurgent is currently facing. For example, an insurgency within the first phase that is focused on building its clandestine political infrastructure poses far less of a direct challenge to the stability of a government than an insurgency on the cusp of conducting phase three military operations.

FM 3-24.2 also discusses the population-centric nature of insurgency and how it is often a competition between the counterinsurgent and insurgent for the support of the populace. In particular, the manual notes that internal support for the insurgent is

essential for the survival of the insurgents if they are to achieve their objectives.⁴⁸ In addition, it observes that popular support contains active and passive support, and that passive support is often of more utility to the insurgent. Passive support provides the insurgent freedom of movement without harassment from the local populace. The manual also notes insurgents will actively coerce the populace to support their activities, a factor which may undermine the willingness of the populace to support the insurgency long-term.⁴⁹

Joint Publication 3-24 Creates Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine

JP 3-24 provides US military forces a much broader definition of insurgency by stating “insurgencies are primarily internal conflicts that focus on the population. The insurgent goal of gaining power, influence and freedom of action may not extend to overthrowing the government but only to gaining power and influence at a rate or extent beyond legal means.”⁵⁰ The JP 3-24 definition differs from FM 3-24 and advances the concept that insurgents may not want to overthrow a government but may instead be seeking to undermine its authority and ability to operate. It also states that the insurgents generally work towards four objectives: political change, overthrow of a government, resistance against occupation and nullified political control in an area. By defining insurgency and its objectives in a much broader fashion, JP 3-24 provides analysts and

⁴⁸Ibid., 2-16.

⁴⁹Ibid., 2-21.

⁵⁰Ibid., 2-24.

strategists a more useful and broader analytical framework for understanding the nature and operations of an insurgency.

JP 3-24 includes a similar description of insurgency dynamics that are currently in FM 3-24 and states that it is an indispensable part of mission analysis.⁵¹ The eight dynamics of insurgency within JP 3-24 are: leadership, objectives, ideology, operational environment, external support, internal support, phasing and timing and organization and operational approaches. While very similar, JP 3-24 adds the dynamic of internal support as a factor which is important to understanding how an insurgency operates. This manual also contains significantly more detail and discussion on the characteristics of the eight insurgency dynamics. For example, JP 3-24 discusses the different types of leadership that exist within an insurgency and the relative importance and impact they have upon the conduct of an insurgency. Army doctrine also explores many of these dynamics under the operational variables of PMESII-PT but it is a useful reminder of the factors which should be examined by counterinsurgents.

Another significant area of discussion within JP 3-24 is the concept of insurgent organization and types of personnel. JP 3-24 states insurgents are generally divided between a political wing focused on building and maintaining popular support and a military wing focused on conducting violent activity against the insurgent's opponents.⁵² By delineating the insurgent organization in this manner, the manual does an effective job of highlighting the importance of non-violent activity of an insurgency. The manual further breaks down the components of an insurgency into the five categories which are:

⁵¹Ibid., II-14.

⁵²Ibid., II-17.

strategic leaders, underground, guerrillas, cadre and auxiliaries. These five categories are interrelated and are advancing an insurgency along multiple lines of operation towards one of the four previously identified insurgent objectives.⁵³ By identifying individuals engaged in non-violent subversion of the state, JP 3-24 lays the intellectual groundwork for constructing a full-spectrum counterinsurgency approach that targets the whole of an insurgency as opposed to just the militants conducting violence.

JP 3-24 identifies for counterinsurgency practitioners seven common approaches employed by insurgents in their struggle against the counterinsurgent.⁵⁴ These approaches are: conspiratorial, military-focused, terrorism focused, identity focused, protracted popular war, subversive and composite and coalition. This section is particularly useful as it lays out the means an insurgency is likely to employ during the conflict and the characteristics useful in identifying the approach. JP 3-24 also contains an appendix which further identifies indicators of many of these insurgent approaches to help frame the nature of the conflict for the commander and military strategists. A limitation of JP 3-24's discussion of insurgent approaches is that it speaks in broad generalities and does not provide examples of current insurgencies employing these different approaches. JP 3-24 differs from FM 3-24 in its discussion of insurgent approaches as it discusses terrorism and subversive approaches to insurgency while deleting the urban insurgency approach found in FM 3-24.

The last major area of discussion within JP 3-24 is the identification of insurgent vulnerabilities which can be exploited by the counterinsurgent's lethal and non-lethal

⁵³Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, 5 October 2009, II-18.

⁵⁴Ibid., II-21.

operations. These vulnerabilities include but are not limited to: secrecy, recruitment and message, base of operations, external support, financing, internal divisions, maintaining momentum, defectors and informants, attrition of resources and leadership. These are the same vulnerabilities discussed within FM 3-24 and reflect a series of factors which have been identified in previous counterinsurgencies which can be exploited. JP 3-24 specifically mentions counterinsurgents should seek to “create or exploit” these vulnerabilities during the course of their operations.⁵⁵ By targeting these vulnerabilities the counterinsurgent can create the conditions for the gradual decline of an insurgent and increase divisions within the mass base of the insurgency.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Current US Doctrine on Insurgency

An examination of the sources used to write FM 3-24 reveals a significant reliance upon Cold War era case studies on the nature of the conflict and its operations. For example, theses from Mao Tse Tung, David Galula, Roger Trinquier and Bard O’Neill are heavily cited throughout the document with little comparison to the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. This omission is largely due to the rapid downturn of the security environment in Iraq and the need for an expedited publication of a new counterinsurgency manual. The more recent articles and books cited within FM 3-24 are academic articles examining successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies conducted by Western powers during the Cold War. While useful, these Cold War histories often had different motivations than the religiously inspired insurgencies which the US was facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the ultimate nature of insurgency, like warfare,

⁵⁵Ibid., II-28.

does not change, the conduct of insurgency is likely to have evolved since the end of the Cold War as have the motivations of insurgents.

The strengths of FM 3-24.2 are its in-depth discussions of the nature and conduct of insurgency and its linkage of operational and mission variables to understanding insurgency within the current operational environment. This manual is effective at helping establish the characteristics of the enemy useful for intelligence analysts and strategists operating at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfighting. The addition of the appendixes, particularly David Kilcullen's essay "28 Articles: The Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency" is a useful update to the more traditional counterinsurgency information present in previous manuals. Some deficiencies of FM 3-24.2 are the inconsistencies in defining insurgent objectives and endstates and its overly prescriptive definitions of insurgent phasing which can lead to an over-reliance upon the doctrine rather than critical thinking on the nature of the conflict.

JP 3-24 relies upon many traditional assessments of insurgency but also uses some more modern discussions of insurgency, particularly from writers such as David Kilcullen's works on Islamist insurgencies in the Middle East and Asia. By using some of the more modern writings on insurgency, the manual is able to take an expanded view of insurgency and its characteristics and conduct. Despite the reliance upon newer works, much of the theory still seems to rely upon Cold War era case studies and could benefit from a discussion of the differences between insurgencies which are primarily motivated by a desire to improve living conditions or remove an occupation as opposed to religiously inspired insurgencies which may have different ideology and narratives and

pose a greater challenge to the counterinsurgent. Despite these shortfalls, the document is still useful for identifying the type of conflict the US is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 3

HIZBALLAH: FROM TERRORISTS TO FULL-SPECTRUM INSURGENTS

Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon

The social and political mobilization of Lebanese Shi'a by Musa al-Sadr during the 1960s laid the foundation for the emergence of Lebanese Hizballah.⁵⁶ Prior to Musa al-Sadr, Lebanese Shi'a found themselves relegated to the margins of Lebanese political society as they had limited political representation in the Lebanese government which was largely run by the Christian and Sunni communities.⁵⁷ In the late 1960s, Musa al-Sadr focused on politically, socially, and religiously mobilizing the Shi'a community to combat the growing secularism present in Lebanese society and to improve the living conditions of many poor Shi'a.⁵⁸ His efforts to improve the life of Lebanese Shi'a was encapsulated in his political program which sought to organize them and improve their socioeconomic conditions, implement a holistic view of Islam, strive for Muslim unity between Sunni and Shi'a, increase cooperation among all Shi'a, fulfill the national and patriotic duties to protect Lebanese security, provide social justice and support

⁵⁶ Musa al-Sadr was a prominent Shi'a cleric who studied in Iran and emigrated to Lebanon in 1959 following an invitation from Grand Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim, the senior religious cleric for southern Lebanon. He also moved to Iran as a result of Iranian repression of fundamentalist Shi'a in the 1960s.

⁵⁷ Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), 60. Lebanese Shi'a are primarily concentrated in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.

⁵⁸ Joseph Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology and Political Program* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2002), 27.

Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation.⁵⁹ He strengthened this effort by his creation of the Shi'a political party Amal and subsequently of a militia to protect the Shi'a from attacks by Palestinian insurgent organizations.⁶⁰

Musa Sadr's creation of Amal in the 1970s and its follow-on militia began the first major mobilization of Lebanese Shi'a and established a base through which Amal and later Hizballah would be able to recruit fighters for the Lebanese civil war. Musa al-Sadr's popularity grew throughout much of the 1970s as Amal sought to improve the life of Lebanese Shi'a.⁶¹ This effort attracted the Shi'a middle class and increased their political activism, a move that in turn expanded the base of the Shi'a political infrastructure. Concurrent with the mobilization of the Lebanese Shi'a was the expansion of Palestinian terrorist activity in the Shi'a regions of Lebanon, resulting in increased tensions between Amal and various Palestinian terrorist groups. These tensions would eventually result in Amal's tacit support for Israeli operations against Palestinians disrupting the way of life for Shi'a in southern Lebanon.⁶² However, Israel's heavy-handed approach to operations in Lebanon and the reported massacre of civilians in the Shatila refugee camps turned Shi'a public opinion against the Israeli government. Amal's passive resistance to Israeli operations facilitated Hizballah's recruitment of disaffected Amal members in the late 1980s.

⁵⁹Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2007), 17.

⁶⁰Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology*, 27.

⁶¹Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, 88.

⁶²Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 23.

In August 1978, Al-Sadr disappeared during a trip to Libya, creating a leadership void within the Lebanese Shi'a community which was filled by Iranian Ayatollahs Khomeini and later Khamanei.⁶³ Despite his disappearance, his legacy was the political and social mobilization of the Lebanese Shi'a community and an increase in Shi'a religious, economic and political expectations within Lebanese society. His disappearance and death also provided a powerful narrative for groups such as Hizballah to exploit as Shi'a religious history is replete with heroic martyrs who give their lives in support of the Shi'a community. Hizballah members used these historical narratives throughout the 1980s and 1990s to build and sustain popular Shi'a support for resistance operations against the Israelis in southern Lebanon.

The Emergence of Lebanese Hizballah: From Terrorists to Legitimate Resistance

Hizballah launched its first operations in 1982 when it began targeting Israeli military operations in Beirut and southern Lebanon in response to Israeli occupation. The group was initially comprised of a small group of Shi'a Islamist hardliners who had studied in Iran and were heavily influenced by the Iranian revolution of 1979.⁶⁴ Iranian religious fundamentalists during the late 1970s had increased their political ties to radical elements of Amal in an effort to gain influence and to support the emergence of radical Islamists within Lebanon.⁶⁵ Several of these individuals later emerged as leaders within Hizballah in the late 1980s. The Iranian government, particularly the Iranian

⁶³Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 22.

⁶⁴Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 34.

⁶⁵Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology*, 31.

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), reportedly played a significant role in providing military and political assistance to the initial cadres of Hizballah.⁶⁶ By early 1983, Hizballah had begun to expand its operations to targeting Western influence, with a particular focus on the US and France. That year it conducted a series of large-scale car bomb attacks which included: the US Marine barracks at Beirut airport, the French military contingent in Beirut, and the US Embassy. These attacks eventually resulted in the withdrawal of Western forces from Beirut in 1984.

Concurrent with Hizballah's car bomb campaign was a well-organized series of kidnappings of Western media, diplomatic and intelligence personnel. These kidnappings likely had the support of the Iranian government and were designed to increase the political and military leverage of Iran and Hizballah over Western governments and to diplomatically isolate the Lebanese government.⁶⁷ Hizballah's kidnappings of US personnel eventually resulted in clandestine US negotiations with the Iranian government. Such negotiations culminated in the Iran-Contra affair, an event which significantly increased Hizballah's capabilities due to the transfer of US stockpiles of TOW missiles to the Iranians in the mid-1980s.⁶⁸ These kidnappings also had the effect of isolating the Lebanese government from international support. Many international aid

⁶⁶Defense Intelligence Agency. *Development of the Hizballah Strategy in South Lebanon*, Washington, DC, March 1987.

⁶⁷US Embassy London, *The Hostages: The View from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah*: 23 March 1990.

⁶⁸The Iran-Contra affair was an illegal transfer of US arms and equipment to Iran in exchange for released hostages and unauthorized third-government support to the Contras in Nicaragua. This scandal culminated in Congressional hearings and indictment/conviction of multiple Reagan Administration officials.

agencies and foreign governments were unwilling to risk sending personnel to Lebanon as a result of the lack of stability within Beirut. The Israeli government continues to negotiate with Hizballah over the fate of personnel believed to have been captured in the early 1980s.

Hizballah publicly unveiled its political platform in 1985 in a manifesto entitled “Downtrodden in Lebanon and World,” a political program which laid out the principles important to Hizballah. Opposition to Western influence within Lebanon, and the Israelis in particular, support for the Shi'a community and the establishment of a Shi'a Islamic government in Beirut, were all key goals of the movement.⁶⁹ The manifesto also praised the Iranian revolution and expressed its solidarity with Ayatollah Khomeini. These goals in the short term appealed to more radical members of the Shi'a community within Lebanon but they continue to undermine Lebanese acceptance of Hizballah as a legitimate political party as opposed to a radical Shi'a political party.

In 1985, Hizballah began expanding its presence into southern Lebanon from its traditional strongholds in the southern suburbs of Beirut. This increased presence facilitated an increase in the number of attacks targeting the Israeli military and its Lebanese proxy, the Army of South Lebanon (SLA). The attacks began as hit-and-run raids but as Hizballah's capabilities grew, they eventually evolved into platoon sized operations and the use of improvised explosive devices and car bombs against Israeli military targets.⁷⁰ Hizballah's attacks appear to have focused on undermining the morale

⁶⁹Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 25.

⁷⁰Defense Intelligence Agency. *Development of the Hizballah Strategy in South Lebanon*, Washington DC, March 1987.

of the SLA and increasing divisions between the Israeli military and its proxy forces in southern Lebanon. By late 1987, these attacks forced the Israelis to change their operations and increase bonuses and incentive pay for SLA members on their payroll. Additionally, Hizballah successes facilitated their expansion into the traditional Amal stronghold of southern Lebanon and set the stage for the 1988-1990 intra-Shi'a violence for control of territory between Amal and Hizballah.⁷¹

Struggle for Influence over Shi'a Community, Tentative Entrance into Politics

The period from the late 1980s to the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary election was a turbulent time for Hizballah as it began its transition from an organization solely focused on violence to a more traditional insurgent group capable of running parallel governance. In that time, Hizballah had to confront its Shi'a rival Amal in Beirut and southern Lebanon, prevent public sentiment from forcing its disarmament, justify its decision to participate in the 1992 Parliamentary elections and continue resistance operations against the Israelis. These decisions increased tensions within the movement and had the potential to lead to fragmentation within the movement. Hizballah was able to overcome these challenges and gain influence at the expense of its Shi'a rival Amal.

Hizballah's expansion into southern Lebanon in the late 1980s and its growing strength during 1987 constituted a direct threat to Amal's control of the Shi'a community.⁷² This concern, when coupled with the expansion of Hizballah's militant

⁷¹Eitan Azani, *Hizballah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 68.

⁷²DIA, *Development of Hizballah Strategy*.

strength, increased tensions between both organizations. These tensions came to a head in February 1988, when Hizballah kidnapped US Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins in southern Lebanon.⁷³ Amal's arrest of Hizballah activists in response to the kidnapping set off a wave of violence which quickly spread across southern Lebanon and into the suburbs of Beirut in the spring of 1988. Hizballah initially lost significant influence in southern Lebanon as many of its militants were forced to lower their profile by Amal and the Lebanese armed forces. Hizballah was also able to defeat Amal militants in Beirut, offsetting its losses in southern Lebanon. Iranian and Syrian intervention slowed this fighting but it reignited in early 1989 and spread into southern Lebanon. Hizballah was able to restore its influence in several key areas in southern Lebanon from which it could continue resistance operations against the Israelis and the SLA. In November 1990, Iran and Syria pressured Amal and Hizballah to cease fighting and oversaw implementation of a ceasefire between the two groups. The accord brought intra-Shi'a fighting to a halt and legitimized the presence of Hizballah in the south.

The Ta'if Accords in 1989 ended large-scale fighting in Lebanon and established 1992 as the year in which Lebanon would have Parliamentary elections.⁷⁴ This agreement also stipulated that militias in Lebanon would disarm and the Lebanese government

⁷³LTC Higgins was participating in a UN Observer mission in southern Lebanon when he was abducted by Hizballah in February 1988. He was later murdered by Hizballah.

⁷⁴The 1989 Ta'if Accords, also known as the National Reconciliation Agreement was a power-sharing agreement reached between Sunni, Shi'a and Christian leadership to set the conditions for the end of the Lebanese civil war. It also called for the disarmament of sectarian and political militias and for the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon. Hassem Krayem, *The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta'if Agreement*, American University of Beirut, <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html> (accessed 19 December 2009).

would be the sole possessor of weapons within the country. The exclusion of Hizballah and the call for the disarmament of militias was a direct challenge to the legitimacy of Hizballah as a major Lebanese political actor. In response to the Ta'if Accords, Hizballah instituted a large-scale information campaign which emphasized Hizballah's role as legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.⁷⁵ Additionally, Hizballah's continued attacks against Israeli and SLA forces in southern Lebanon supported Hizballah's claim to be the only organization continuing to resist Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and led to the Lebanese government reluctantly accepting Hizballah as an Islamic resistance organization.

The 1992 parliamentary elections forced Hizballah's leadership to decide if it was going to participate in Lebanese governance or continue to undermine the legitimacy of the Lebanese state through violence and propaganda. During much of the 1980s, Hizballah had worked to weaken the Christian dominated government through kidnappings, car bomb attacks and propaganda. A decision by Hizballah's leadership to participate in the 1992 elections would be a rejection of a long-standing policy of not participating in a non-Islamic government and might alienate hardliners within the movement who were dedicated to establishing an Islamic republic within Lebanon. Over a period of months, intense discussions ensued between senior Hizballah figures over the future of the organization.⁷⁶ Ultimately, Hizballah leadership decided to participate in the elections. The leadership justified its decision by noting it would help increase its

⁷⁵Central Intelligence Agency, *Lebanese Hizballah: Testing Political Waters, Keeping Militant Agenda*, July 1992, 2.

⁷⁶Atani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, 95.

openness in Lebanese society and provide access to governmental resources to facilitate continued violence against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.⁷⁷ To mitigate the challenge of Hizballah hard-liners opposed to political participation, Hizballah leaders sought and received Iran Supreme Leader Khamanei's support for participation in the political process. They also publicly stated their political participation did not end Hizballah's efforts to create an Islamic state in Lebanon.

Hizballah then initiated a large-scale propaganda campaign targeted at the Lebanese population to shed its image as a radical Islamist group bent on recreating the Iranian revolution. Hizballah's political platform emphasized the group's role in protecting the oppressed. To support this platform it released a political manifesto which focused on reinvigorating resistance to Israel, increasing ties with sectarian rivals, healing the rift between Hizballah and the Christian community and improving socio-economic conditions in Lebanon.⁷⁸ Following the release of these documents, Hizballah officials met with senior Lebanese government leaders on multiple occasions to discuss controversial issues such as security in Beirut, assimilating some Hizballah fighters into the Lebanese armed forces, resistance operations in southern Lebanon and expanding economic aid for the Shi'a community.⁷⁹ Hizballah officials also met with the leaders of their sectarian rivals including the major Christian parties, in an effort to build stronger political ties across sectarian lines and rehabilitate their image among the Lebanese. They

⁷⁷ Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology*, 152.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 151.

⁷⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Lebanese Hizballah: Testing Political Waters, Keeping Militant Agenda*, July 1992.

also expanded their socioeconomic outreach and services for poor Shi'a in Beirut and southern Lebanon in an effort to move beyond their image of radical Islamists bent on implementing Islamic law within Lebanon.

Despite Hizballah's focus on consolidating its position within the Shi'a community and participating in parliamentary elections, the movement continued to target the Israeli military and the SLA in southern Lebanon. These incidents were primarily indirect fire attacks and improvised explosive devices and sought to undermine the morale of both the Israeli military and the SLA. CIA analysis indicates these attacks increased in intensity and scope throughout much of 1992, as Hizballah also sought to burnish its resistance credentials as part of its political platform. The terrorist activities of Hizballah expanded beyond the Middle East during this time period when it conducted multiple attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Argentina and London in response to Israel's assassination of Hizballah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi. These attacks significantly increased the threat to Israeli interests worldwide and provided the movement an additional deterrence against Israeli operations targeting Hizballah's senior leadership.

Hizballah's efforts to reinvent its image paid dividends as the Hizballah-affiliated Loyalty to Resistance political bloc won eight seats in the Lebanese Parliament during the 1992 elections. This bloc won a small level of representation in national politics but set the conditions for the movement to begin its legitimization in Lebanese political society. Hizballah propaganda efforts, along with its continued violence against the Israelis, helped rebrand the group from its traditional stereotype of an Iranian affiliated terrorist organization to a more legitimate image as a Shi'a political party dedicated to the

withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. This success proved to be problematic as it increased the populace's expectations of the movement. It also created new challenges as it was expected to continue providing a broader range of services and to focus less on conducting resistance operations against the Israelis.

Hizballah Intensifies Attacks in South, Begins Alienating Populace

Lebanese expectations for a return to normalcy had increased throughout 1992, as the government was able to hold parliamentary elections and the major sectarian militias began disarming, with the exception of Hizballah. Many Lebanese saw the Tai'f Accord and the elections as an opportunity to move beyond the violence of the civil war and to begin rebuilding Lebanon. Hizballah, on the other hand, viewed the election as validation that its policies of resistance had widespread support within the Lebanese community and that an expansion of attacks against the Israelis had widespread support within Lebanese society. As a result of this analysis, Hizballah shifted its resources to support an expansion of violence against the Israelis and the SLA at the expense of its social programs in Beirut and southern Lebanon. This shift in focus hurt Hizballah during the 1996 Parliamentary elections as it saw its political influence decline in comparison to its rival Amal.

Following its success in the 1992 elections, Hizballah dedicated additional resources to its military wing which was conducting increasingly effective operations targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hizballah may have allocated as much as half of its budget to resistance operations during this time period.⁸⁰ Hizballah operations

⁸⁰Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, 106.

aggressively targeted Israeli military forces and elicited strong Israeli responses consisting of air and indirect fire attacks against Lebanese villages in southern Lebanon. Many Lebanese in these areas blamed such actions for provoking Israeli retaliatory attacks which increased hardships for Lebanese Shi'a which Hizballah claimed to be protecting. Hizballah responded to the decrease in public support by shifting attacks from Israeli forces in southern Lebanon to settlements in northern Israel. The group linked its rocket attacks in northern Israel to Israeli military operations which impacted which targeted Lebanese civilians.⁸¹

Hizballah's political platform in the run-up to the 1996 Parliamentary elections focused on highlighting its continued resistance operations against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, as well as its role as a protector of the Lebanese Shi'a. Unlike the 1992 Parliamentary elections, this platform had become increasingly unpopular as many Lebanese Shi'a had also come to expect Lebanese Hizballah to maintain a significant focus on its socio-economic programs. These programs had declined in importance from 1992 to 1996 and this decline would be reflected in Hizballah's election results in 1996.

The 1996 Parliamentary elections shocked Hizballah as the organization lost two of its eight seats in the Lebanese Parliament to its major Shi'a rival Amal. In addition, public frustration with the movement became much more pronounced, dealing a blow to the senior leadership of Hizballah and resulting in a significant change in the political, military and socioeconomic strategies the movement would employ throughout the late 1990s. This strategy change, coupled with Israeli overreactions to Hizballah, increased

⁸¹Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, 86.

the movement's strength and positioned it for an expansion of its influence and power in Lebanon.

Hizballah Changes Strategy and Forces Israel's Retreat from Lebanon

Hizballah's electoral losses in 1996 forced the leadership to change its political, military, and socio-economic strategies in order to rebuild its political influence. Israel's indiscriminate attacks in southern Lebanon resulted in widespread international condemnation when it targeted a UN refugee camp and killed over 100 civilians. This attack reinvigorated Lebanese public support for Hizballah. By contrast, Hizballah's effective targeting of Israeli military targets, including Israeli Special Forces and senior leadership in southern Lebanon, increased Israeli domestic pressure for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. During the mid to late 1990s, Hizballah was also able to develop its own television station Al-Manar and a series of newspapers and magazines it could distribute to more effectively send its message to the Lebanese people. Al-Manar eventually grew to be a major Middle Eastern news source for Hizballah and promote political and military resistance to Western influence in the Middle East.

From 1996 to 2000, Hizballah shifted its political strategy and focused on local governance as a means to increase its influence within Lebanese society. The 1998 local elections became increasingly important as the movement saw an opportunity to build its political base and influence national politics by controlling the local governments and channeling support to its traditional support base. To support these efforts Hizballah focused its socioeconomic support in southern Lebanon on improving local agriculture for subsistence farmers and quickly rebuilding infrastructure damaged during fighting

between Hizballah and the Israelis.⁸² In urban locations Hizballah increased its provision of medical aid, food subsidies and literacy programs to rebuild its image within the community. These programs received substantial Iranian financial support and enabled Hizballah to provide social services superior to legitimate government organizations within Lebanon. Over time, these services became available to all Lebanese citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious preferences, helping to build Hizballah's claim to represent all Lebanese.⁸³

Another significant aspect of Hizballah's new strategy emphasized the Lebanese nature of the movement and its devotion to Lebanese security and independence.⁸⁴ In 1997, the movement published a document which explicitly stated Hizballah was Lebanese rather than Shi'a and was dedicated to creating Pan-Lebanese resistance to the Israelis. Hizballah leadership instructed its followers to display Lebanese flags rather than Hizballah colors at its rallies. This change in public message, when coupled with increased socioeconomic outreach to Lebanese of all sects and religions, helped minimize the fundamentalist nature of the movement and its continued dedication to implementing an Islamic state within Lebanon. Perhaps the most visible part of this new strategy was Hizballah's inclusion of Sunni and Christian candidates on its election slate in the 1998 elections.⁸⁵

⁸²Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, 116.

⁸³Norton, *Short History of Hezbollah*, 109-110.

⁸⁴Eyal Zisser, *Hizballah: Between Armed Struggle and Domestic Politics* (New York Press, 2003), 94.

⁸⁵Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology*, 157.

Hizballah's military strategy evolved during the late 1990s, as it perceived that Israeli domestic support for continuing operations in southern Lebanon continued to decline. In addition, Hizballah's leadership saw an opportunity to solidify its image as a Lebanese organization and invited non-Shi'a Lebanese to join a special unit to conduct resistance operations against Israel. Hizballah's military operations increasingly focused on conducting high-profile attacks which would generate multiple casualties and at creating significant rifts between the Israeli military and the SLA. As Israel's withdrawal became increasingly likely, Hizballah conducted effective information operations campaigns targeting the resolve of the SLA and its willingness to continue working with Israeli forces during their drawdown in 1999 and 2000.⁸⁶ In 1999 and 2000, Hizballah offered to allow any SLA fighter who deserted his post to reintegrate into Lebanese society without fear of retribution.

During the late 1990s, the military capabilities of Hizballah continued to increase as it was able to conduct effective platoon-sized operations targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Intelligence gathering operations against Israeli forces enabled the movement to conduct highly competent attacks against elite elements of the Israeli military as they conducted operations in southern Lebanon. These attacks included an ambush of Israeli Special Forces that killed all the members of the Israeli team and multiple attacks against Merkava tanks and other Israeli armored vehicles that resulted in their complete destruction.⁸⁷ Such high-profile attacks increased in intensity as Israeli

⁸⁶Matt M. Matthews, “*We Were Caught Unprepared” The 2006 Hizballah-Israel War* (Fort Leavenworth KS, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), 9.

⁸⁷Helmer, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000*, 58.

morale began to decline in the late 1990s and as domestic Israeli politics began to increasingly demand an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. An illustration of the level of the threat Hizballah posed to Israeli forces was the 28 February, 1999, attack on the Israeli Defense Force commander for southern Lebanon which resulted in his death and the destruction of all vehicles in his convoy.⁸⁸ Hizballah also kept up pressure on the Israelis by using standoff anti-tank weapons such as TOW missiles to target fixed fortifications and increase the vulnerability of these locations.⁸⁹ These attacks often resulted in multiple Israeli casualties and increased the political pressure on Israeli politicians to withdraw forces from southern Lebanon.

An additional component of Hizballah's military strategy was the maintenance of pressure on Israel through continued attacks against settlements in northern Israel. Hizballah was often able to conduct these attacks with minimal interference as they consisted of one to four 107mm rockets pre-set to launch after the indirect fire teams left the launch site. The inability of the Israeli military to counter such attacks emboldened Hizballah's escalation of violence and demoralized members of the Israeli military and civilian communities in northern Israel. Israel's struggle to combat these attacks also built Lebanese Shi'a support for Hizballah, as the organization seemed to operate with impunity against the Israelis.

Hizballah's changes to its political, socioeconomic and military strategies significantly improved its position within Lebanese society and positioned the movement for opportunities to increase its influence in Lebanon. In the 1998 municipal elections,

⁸⁸Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 6.

⁸⁹Ibid., 10.

Hizballah won political control of nearly half of the municipal councils in Beirut and southern Lebanon, greatly expanding the group's political influence and control. These elections results helped further legitimize the movement in Lebanese political life and more importantly, provided Hizballah political top-cover for its unwillingness to disarm in accordance with the Ta'if Accord. Hizballah's participation in the political process also mitigated some of the extremists within the movement as it has become more difficult for Hizballah to use violence as it was now responsive to the ballot box.

Many within Lebanon and the Arab world saw Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon as the first major Arab victory over the Israeli military. This defeat of Israeli forces increased the prestige of the movement and its image within the Middle East and Lebanon. Despite this victory, the withdrawal of the Israelis soon forced Hizballah to justify its continued possession of arms and maintenance of a dual-track policy of political involvement and military force. The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the subsequent realignment of Lebanese domestic priorities placed the movement on the defensive and in search of a reason for continued military activity by the organization.

Israeli Withdrawal Forces Hizballah Self-Examination

Domestic and international pressure increased for Hizballah's disarmament and sole registration as a political party following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. Hizballah leadership was forced to justify its continued military activities which were parallel to the existence of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February, 2005, also placed the movement in a quandary as Syria had to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon in

response to Lebanese and international condemnation of its activities.⁹⁰ Despite these challenges Hizballah was able to gain political ground and prepare for a future conflict with Israel through their continued outreach to the Shi'a community and their external support from Iran.

Hizballah quickly moved to consolidate its control over southern Lebanon following Israel's withdrawal.⁹¹ Its fighters occupied former military camps used by the Israeli military and the SLA and began building fortifications in an effort to prevent an Israeli return to southern Lebanon. They additionally moved advanced weaponry such as long-range rockets into these areas to enable them to continue targeting northern Israel and maintain military pressure on Israel. In an effort to continue justifying military operations, Hizballah claimed that Israel's occupation of the Sheb'a Farms legitimized on-going violence against Israeli forces. This violence primarily consisted of rocket attacks into northern Israel, attacks which elicited Israeli artillery strikes against the Lebanese population in retaliation. Many Lebanese, particularly those in southern Lebanon, quickly grew weary of this violence as they were content with Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and viewed the dispute over the Sheb'a farms "as not worth the continued fighting."⁹²

⁹⁰Rafik Hariri was a prominent Lebanese politician opposed to Syrian occupation of Lebanon who was assassinated in February, 2005, in Beirut. His death sparked massive protests and a United Nations special investigation. Syria was widely suspected of being behind the assassination.

⁹¹Zisser, *Between Armed Struggle and Domestic Politics*, 96.

⁹²International Crisis Group, *Hizballah: Rebel Without a Cause?* Amman/Brussels (30 July 2003), 7.

An additional notion that Hizballah used to justify its continued military operations revolved around its claim to support Palestinian resistance operations against the Israelis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On October 7, 2000, Hizballah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers to show solidarity with the Palestinian resistance organization Hamas. While Hizballah claimed to support the Palestinians, in reality their support remained fairly limited and their violence was often done to maintain appearances as much as to achieve a military effect.⁹³ Lebanese support for Palestinian violence remains limited as many Lebanese blame Palestinian militant activity in the 1970s as having brought multiple Israeli invasions of the country.

International pressure for Hizballah's disarmament began to gain momentum following Al-Qaida's attack against multiple targets in the US on September 11, 2001. For many years, the US government had sought to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Hizballah through economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Syria and Iran. These efforts intensified when the US government began publicly referring to Syria and Iran as major sponsors of state terrorism and stating that Hizballah was the greater long-term terrorist threat to the U.S. and its interests in the Middle East.⁹⁴ This effort received significant support from Israel but many Western European governments were unwilling to publicly condemn Hizballah or label them a terrorist organization. This lack of international support changed with the death of Rafik Hariri in early 2005.

In late 2004, Hariri had intensified his criticism of the Syrian regime following its clumsy intervention in Lebanese presidential politics to ensure President Lahoud

⁹³Ibid., 9.

⁹⁴Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, 237.

served a third term. In response to the Syrian intervention, Hariri and his cabinet resigned in protest. Two months later a car bomb in Beirut killed him, leading many within Lebanon to accuse Syria of his assassination. His death triggered a wave of protests, the most notable being the 14 March, 2005, demonstration which called for the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon. The US, France and several other Western countries significantly increased their pressure on Syria to withdraw its military and intelligence forces from Lebanon. Additionally, the 14 March bloc, comprised of Sunni and Christian political parties and supported by major Sunni regional governments such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, moved to investigate the assassination of Hariri and the nature of Hizballah's participation in Lebanon's political process. Hizballah and its traditional rival Amal worked together to thwart the activities of the 14 March group during the run-up to the May 2005 parliamentary elections. This cooperation was likely done to prevent the Shi'a community from being shut out of the political process.

The May 2005 parliamentary elections were the first elections in which Hizballah was able to gain cabinet ministries, in this case Labor and Energy. During these elections, Hizballah fielded Sunnis and a Christian on its list and increased its representation to 14 members of parliament.⁹⁵ The relatively strong performance of Hizballah and Amal, two political parties believed to have strong relationships with Syria and Iran, is indicative of the level of support they have garnered within the Lebanese Shi'a community. These election results also facilitated Hizballah and Amal's obstruction of the United Nations investigation into the Hariri assassination and international efforts to force a Hizballah disarmament.

⁹⁵ Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology*, 294.

2006-Present: Hizballah Solidifies
Status as a State Within a State

Hizballah's efforts to fortify its positions in southern Lebanon and the stockpiling of weapons from 2000-2006, left the group well-postured to military confront Israel in the summer of 2006.⁹⁶ The Israeli military and other regional governments severely underestimated the size of Hizballah's fortifications in southern Lebanon and the extent of its preparations for future conflict. Hizballah had created specialized military formations to conduct conventional military attacks against the Israelis in addition to their traditional guerrilla units.⁹⁷ Additionally, it incorporated new weapons systems into its military inventory and procured tens of thousands of long-range rockets capable of targeting major Israeli cities, increasing the military threat to the average Israeli.⁹⁸ Hizballah's ability to conduct a successful area defense against Israeli ground and air operations in July 2006 may have redefined the conduct of insurgency and created a new template through which insurgencies can be viewed.

On 12 July 2006, a platoon of Hizballah fighters ambushed an Israeli military convoy in Northern Israel, killing several Israeli soldiers and capturing two. Hizballah's intent for this operation was to use the soldiers as political leverage against the Israeli government and to gain prisoner releases. Instead, this operation had the opposite effect. Within hours the Israeli military was conducting large-scale air attacks against

⁹⁶ Andrew Exum, "Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 63 (December 2006), 5.

⁹⁷ Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizballah's Ideology*, 57.

⁹⁸ Elias Hanna, "Lessons Learned From the Recent War in Lebanon," *Military Review* 87, no. 5 (September-October 2007): 86.

infrastructure across southern Lebanon. The sharp escalation in Israeli air attacks against targets in Lebanon was countered by a constant barrage of nearly 100 medium and long-range rockets from southern Lebanon into Israel.⁹⁹ After several weeks of ineffective air attacks against Hizballah, the Israeli army launched a limited ground incursion into southern Lebanon that was met with strong and effective guerrilla and conventional resistance by Hizballah military units. Hizballah conducted an effective defense of southern Lebanon and used conventional fighters and guerrilla forces to great effect against Israel. In one engagement, Israeli press accounts state Hizballah disabled eleven Merkava 4 main battle tanks of the Israeli army, preventing Israel from bringing its armored forces into the fight.¹⁰⁰ Israel's inability to militarily defeat Hizballah, along with growing international pressure on the Israeli government, led to a 14 August cease-fire in which Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon and the United Nations dispatched an enhanced peacekeeping force along the Lebanese border with Israel.

The 2006 conflict between Hizballah and Israel represented a fairly significant shift in Middle Eastern dynamics as Hizballah was one of the first Arab organizations to militarily challenge and defeat Israel. During the conflict, Hizballah effectively employed advanced weapons systems such as anti-tank weapons, long-range rockets, and most unexpectedly, anti-ship cruise missiles against the Israeli military. Hizballah used AT-14 Kornet anti-tank missiles along with RPG-29s to negate Israel's armor advantage and successfully attacked an Israeli warship on 14 July 2006, with a C802 anti-ship missile, a

⁹⁹Matthews, *We Were Unprepared*, 43.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 55.

weapons system Israel was unaware was in Hizballah's military inventory.¹⁰¹ The 2006 conflict also revealed that Hizballah's military capabilities enabled it to conduct tactical military operations on-par with its Israeli counterparts, a fact that has served to deter additional Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon.¹⁰²

Following the 2006 conflict, many Lebanese politicians, particularly the Sunni community and the 14 March Coalition, became increasingly concerned that Hizballah's actions against the Israelis could plunge Lebanon into additional conflicts with Israeli without the knowledge or consent of the Lebanese government. These concerns focused on Hizballah's possession of military weapons superior to the Lebanese military, Hizballah's private communications network, and their use of media outlets such as Al-Manar. In late 2006, Hizballah sought to use protests and general strikes to gain additional concessions from the Lebanese government, acts which only increased Lebanese government concern with the status of Hizballah weapons and continuing activities. These actions began to alienate the Sunni and Christian community but also had the benefit of solidifying Hizballah's support from the Shi'a community. As communal tensions continued to increase throughout 2007 and early 2008, many Shi'a began viewing Hizballah as their protector should sectarian violence reignite.¹⁰³

On 8 May, 2008, the Lebanese government attempted to remove the Hizballah affiliated head of security at Beirut airport and shut down the group's private

¹⁰¹Ibid., 38.

¹⁰²Exum, "Hizballah at War," 1.

¹⁰³International Crisis Group, *Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis*, Middle East Report Number 69 (10 October 2007), 6.

telecommunications network. Within hours of this effort, Hizballah had effectively seized most of western Beirut and shut down the government, triggering a political crisis that would only be resolved by the Doha Accords in late May 2008.¹⁰⁴ The Doha Accords were a significant concession to the Hizballah-led opposition movement because they gave the opposition eleven seats out of thirty in the cabinet and provided the opposition veto power as each major Lebanese government decision requires the support of more than two thirds of the Lebanese cabinet.¹⁰⁵ This veto power allowed Hizballah and its allies to prevent any government efforts to disarm the movement and solidified its position within Lebanon.

The June 2009 parliamentary elections between the 14 March Coalition and the Hizballah-led 8 March Coalition were seen by many as a referendum for Lebanon's identity and whether or not it would be aligned with Western governments or the Syrian and Iranian governments. These elections were a victory for the 14 March Coalition as it won the majority of parliamentary seats (71 out of 128) as opposed to 8 March's 57 seats in the Parliament. It should be noted, however, that the 8 March Coalition won 100,000 more votes than the 14 March Coalition but not as many seats due to the complex makeup of Lebanon's political structure and electoral map. Despite its disappointing performance, Hizballah still maintains two cabinet positions and significant influence

¹⁰⁴Tim McGirk and Andrew Lee, "Welcome to Hizballahstan" *Time Magazine*, 171, no. 21 (May 2008): 1.

¹⁰⁵Akhavi Khody, "Lebanon's Elections: An International Affair," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 28, no. 6: 35-36.

within Parliament and the Lebanese cabinet.¹⁰⁶ This influence led the Lebanese cabinet on 2 December, 2009, to approve a policy statement which endorsed Hizballah's right to keep its weapons as part of the resistance and to protect the security of Lebanon.¹⁰⁷ This policy statement will reportedly go to the Lebanese parliament for approval and could be a major step forward in politically legitimizing Hizballah's parallel military structure within Lebanon.

On 30 November, 2009, in a public interview on the Hizballah-run al-Manar TV station, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah publicly unveiled a new political manifesto.¹⁰⁸ This program enumerated Hizballah's political, military and economic goals for the future of Lebanon. The manifesto stated that the group's leadership believed "resistance was in an ascending phase" and that Hizballah's military forces were a deterrent to Israeli and US interference in internal Lebanese affairs. Additionally, this document stated the Lebanese government required the existence of the Lebanese forces and the "national resistance" led by Hizballah to prevent Israeli and US interference in domestic Lebanese affairs. Hizballah believed the Lebanese armed forces were currently not strong enough to defend the Lebanese state. Nasrallah also stated that Hizballah was

¹⁰⁶"Lebanon finally forms government" British Broadcasting Company, 10 November, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8351651.stm (accessed: 29 December 2009).

¹⁰⁷Zeina Karam, "Lebanon Lets Hezbollah Keep its Weapons," *Boston Globe* (3 December 2009), 12.

¹⁰⁸"Nasrallah Holds News Conference, Announces Hizballah's New Political Document," Open Source Center, GMP20091130644002, al-Manar Channel Television, 1330 GMT 30 November 2009.

committed to the Lebanese political process to build the Lebanese state and remained dedicated to assisting Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

The future trajectory for Hizballah is one in which the organization balances its need to continue military operations against the Israelis with maintaining its political position within Lebanese society. Hizballah's ability to harness traditional Shi'a narratives of martyrdom and oppression and use them as a social mobilization tool have been emulated by individuals such as Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq to varying degrees of success. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Sadr movement in Iraq are currently emulating Hizballah's parallel governance by employing subversion and political participation while refraining from overt political violence. This model of Islamist insurgency has redefined insurgency as the Sadrists in Iraq seek to transform society as much as they seek to overthrow governments. Hizballah's efforts to navigate Lebanese politics is likely to provide some indicators which may be useful for analyzing insurgencies in the coming years in places such as Yemen, Iraq, Egypt and Pakistan.

CHAPTER 4

THE RISE, FALL AND RESURGENCE OF THE TALIBAN

1979 Soviet Union Invasion Mobilizes Afghan Tribal and Religious Leadership

The emergence of the Taliban in 1994 is rooted in the efforts of Afghan communists in the late 1970s through the late 1980s to replace Afghan tribal society and remake it into a Soviet-style socialist society within Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ Afghan tribal and religious leaders mobilized in 1978 to counter efforts to create a socialist society in Afghanistan. Broad-based tribal and religious resistance to Kabul intensified throughout 1978 and 1979 and overwhelmed the ability of the government to control the country.¹¹⁰ In response, the Soviet Union on 24 December, 1979, deployed special operations and airborne units to Kabul to depose the sitting Afghan president and install new Afghan leadership.¹¹¹ The Pakistani and US governments saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an effort to expand Soviet hegemony into South Asia and the invasion resulted in US, Pakistani and Middle Eastern support to Afghan resistance fighters.¹¹²

The Soviet Union, in conjunction with its Afghan government allies, quickly moved to establish control across Afghanistan. However, the Soviets soon found

¹⁰⁹Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan* (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002), ix.

¹¹⁰US State Department, *The Afghan Army and Anti-DRA fighting*, US Consulate Peshawar, 14 February 1979.

¹¹¹US State Department, *Current Status of the Insurrection in Afghanistan*, US Embassy Kabul, 4 June, 1979.

¹¹²Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 39.

themselves confronted by a multitude of resistance groups across the country. Soviet and Afghan counterinsurgency efforts included air attacks targeting villages across southern and eastern Afghanistan as well as cordons and sweeps which sought to deny the Afghan insurgency freedom of movement and isolate the insurgents from the populace.¹¹³ Soviet efforts were effective at depopulating large sections of Afghanistan and preventing Afghans from conducting agricultural activities, which had the effect of making significant sections of Afghanistan inhospitable to guerrilla operations. This strategy led to large-scale refugee flows to Pakistan, increasing the financial burden on the Pakistani government but also providing a captive audience for recruitment by Pakistani intelligence and radical Islamist parties. Pakistani intelligence supported religious parties' efforts to indoctrinate Afghan refugees in a series of madrassas (religious schools) in the tribal areas of Pakistan to create a new base of Afghan resistance fighters.¹¹⁴ By the mid 1980s, insurgents across Afghanistan were placed on the defensive as they often lacked adequate weaponry to confront Soviet and Afghan airpower. It should be noted that the Afghan/Pakistan border is largely a Western construct and most Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun believe the border is a technicality and freely cross between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Throughout the 1980s, cross-sectarian insurgency elements comprised of ethnic Pashtun, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks who were all dedicated to removing Soviet influence from Afghanistan, aggressively countered the invader's efforts to expand that

¹¹³US State Department, *The Afghan Resistance Movement*, Bureau of Intelligence And Research, 19 January 1982.

¹¹⁴Nojumi, "The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan," 119-120.

influence.¹¹⁵ The most prominent Pashtun commander during the 1980s was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who had significant ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and Gulf state intelligence services along with the US government and Arab fighters who would eventually comprise al-Qaida. The Tajik resistance in northern Afghanistan was led by the talented commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, who became known as the “Lion of Pansjir” for his ability to conduct effective resistance operations against the Soviets. Afghan insurgent operations initially included poorly equipped and trained fighters but over time demonstrated an ability to conduct operations capable of denying terrain to Soviet forces and retaking territory from the Afghan government and its Soviet backers. In response to the growing abilities of Afghan insurgents, the Soviets deployed advanced attack helicopters to Afghanistan and exploited the Afghan insurgents’ lack of modern air defenses to regain the initiative against the insurgency.

The US, Pakistani, Chinese and many Middle Eastern governments responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by providing weapons, financial and political support to Afghan resistance fighters. This support was initially limited but as Afghan resistance increasingly began to take on religious overtones, Pakistani support significantly increased in terms of weapons and financial support. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the ascendancy of US intelligence officials and policy-makers willing to assume risk in challenging Soviet actions in Afghanistan led to increased support to Afghan resistance efforts. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert support to the Afghan resistance was primarily routed through the ISI, with little direct US control over

¹¹⁵ Robert Kaplan, *Soldiers of God, With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (New York Random House Publishing, 2001), 23.

which factions received the military aid.¹¹⁶ ISI channeled the majority of its support to Pashtun insurgent organizations and neglected non-Pashtun organizations. In the mid-1980s, the Saudi Arabian government agreed to match US funding of the Afghan resistance, effectively doubling the amount of support these fighters were receiving.¹¹⁷ To improve Afghan air and anti-armor capabilities, in the late 1980s the CIA provided advanced weapons such as STINGER anti-air missiles, long-range sniper rifles and anti-tank weapons to Afghan insurgent organizations.¹¹⁸

The decision by the US government to channel its support for the Afghan insurgency through the ISI enabled the Pakistani government to strengthen its influence over Pashtun Islamist resistance fighters at the expense of non-Pashtun or secular resistance organizations. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JUI) political party heavily influenced the Pakistani government under Zia al-Haqq in the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹¹⁹ As a result of this influence, the Pakistani government, and the ISI in particular, sought to provide significant military and logistics support to groups sharing similar ideologies with JUI and helped Pakistan increase its influence among the Pashtun resistance organizations. Additionally, the Afghan Bureau of ISI was increasingly comprised of Pakistani military officers with Pashtun backgrounds.¹²⁰ These efforts later paid significant dividends for

¹¹⁶Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 63.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 89.

¹¹⁸Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*, 43.

¹¹⁹JUI is a Pakistani political party with strong linkages to radical Islamists dedicated to implementing 7th century Islamic law in Pakistan and has significant ties to groups such as al-Qaida.

¹²⁰Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 65.

the Pakistani government as it gained a significant degree of influence with Pashtun militant groups.¹²¹ Additionally, the Pakistani government through religious parties such as JUI allowed radical Islamists from throughout the Middle East to operate along the border with Afghanistan, unintentionally allowing these Islamists to begin organizing into the group which would later become known as Al-Qaida. These radical Islamists expanded their ties to Pashtun resistance fighters, laying the groundwork for the relationship which would emerge in the 1990s between the Taliban and Al-Qaida.

Soviet casualties in Afghanistan, along with its inability to suppress the insurgency and growing economic challenges for the Soviet government played a significant role in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988.¹²² Growing popular unrest in the Soviet Union over the state of economic conditions and decreasing Soviet leadership interest in Afghanistan operations resulted in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 14 April, 1988, Geneva Accords between the Afghan and Pakistani governments agreed to a “cessation of Pakistani support to militants” in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.¹²³ Soviet combat forces withdrew from Afghanistan in accordance with the Geneva Accords in February 1989 but retained an “advisory and assistance group” of military officers to support Afghan government forces in their efforts to stabilize the country. The Afghan resistance forces rejected the agreement and remained dedicated to overthrowing the Afghan government, a dedication

¹²¹Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*, 233.

¹²²United States Army, *Lessons from the Afghanistan War*, Combat Studies Institute, June 1989.

¹²³U.S. Library of Congress, <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/29.htm> (accessed 10 January 2010).

which ultimately plunged Afghanistan into a violent civil war that led directly to the emergence of the Taliban.

Soviet Withdrawal Creates Conditions for Taliban Emergence

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan set the stage for the 1989 to 1994 Afghan civil war which created the conditions for the Taliban emergence. Emboldened Afghan insurgents interpreted the Soviet withdrawal as a weakening of the Kabul government and continued violence against the central government. Additionally, Pakistani ISI and its Middle Eastern allies worked to promote Gulbuddin Hekmaytar as the heir apparent when the Afghan government was overthrown, undermining efforts by other Afghan resistance groups to create a unified Afghan government.¹²⁴ These divisions led to large-scale fighting in Kabul and other locations in Afghanistan from 1992-1994 and plunged the country into warlordism.¹²⁵ Additionally, radical Islamists sought to exploit the lack of security along the Afghan/Pakistan border to develop their own individual bases of support.

In February and March 1989, Pakistani-linked resistance elements launched a large-scale attack in an attempt to capture the eastern city of Jalalabad and demonstrate the Afghan central government lacked the capacity to govern Afghanistan. Instead, this attack proved to be disastrous as the Pakistani-linked forces tied to Hekmaytar and others were unable to seize the city and were repulsed by the Afghan government after having suffered significant casualties. This defeat emboldened the Afghan government and

¹²⁴Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 182.

¹²⁵US State Department, *The Taliban, Who Knows What the Movement Means*, US Embassy Islamabad, 26 November 1994.

weakened popular support for the insurgency.¹²⁶ The Soviet Union significantly increased its military support to the Afghan government in response to this attack, reportedly providing up to \$300 million per month in food and ammunition. This forced the Afghan insurgency to take the defensive from 1989 through 1991.¹²⁷ With Soviet support, the Afghan communist government was capable of confronting Afghan insurgents, however, the breakup of the Soviet Union led to a cessation of Russian aid for the Afghan government on January 1, 1992. The loss of this support quickly spelled the demise of the Afghan government as it could not provide security on its own. President Najibullah resigned in early 1992 as a result of his inability to suppress the insurgency.¹²⁸

The decentralization of the Afghan insurgency, once a strong suit, now proved to be an Achilles heel for Afghanistan as the country was plunged into civil war in 1992 after major resistance factions could not agree on power sharing. Forces allied to Ahmed Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmaytar fought for control of Kabul and the Afghan government.¹²⁹ The fighting devastated significant portions of Kabul as these resistance factions used heavy weapons such as rockets and artillery fire across the city and surrounding villages as well as in the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan.¹³⁰ The inability of a central government to consolidate control over the Afghan

¹²⁶Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*, 166-167.

¹²⁷Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 194.

¹²⁸Ibid., 233.

¹²⁹Emily MacFarquhar, “From Battleground to Backwater,” *US News and World Report* 115, no. 23 (December 1993), 69.

¹³⁰“An Inside View of an Unholy War,” *Economist* 329, no. 7841 (December 1993).

administration and expand its influence beyond the capital led to security vacuums throughout much of Afghanistan and the emergence of regional warlords in the countryside. Afghan warlords disrupted Afghan commercial activities and preyed upon the local populace, weakening support for the Afghan central government and increased support for groups willing to provide security and stability in Afghanistan. The road from Kandahar to Quetta in Pakistan, a key economic route within Afghanistan, was disrupted by nearly twenty different warlords, each demanding bribes for onward transit.¹³¹ This disruptive behavior ultimately led to the emergence of the Taliban as Afghans grew weary of instability.

Pakistani intelligence used the early 1990s to promote Hekmatyar as their leading candidate for influence and control within Afghanistan. They provided his movement with significant military support including military advisors and weapons to facilitate his efforts to topple the Afghan government. During this time period, the Pakistani government sought to topple the Afghan government and replace it with a weak Afghan government incapable of threatening its security. The Pakistani government also used Arab and Pakistani veterans of the Afghan civil war to conduct operations in the disputed territory of the Kashmir in India as part of its unconventional warfare against the Indian government. This effort maintained Pakistani pressure on the Indian government but also ensured that Pakistani intelligence was able to maintain its influence in the Afghan civil war through its provision of weapons and support to Hekmatyar.¹³²

¹³¹Kaplan, *Soldiers of God*, 235.

¹³²“Strange Calm in Kabul,” *Economist* 328, no. 7829 (September 1993): 41-42.

Afghanistan's instability permitted radical Middle Eastern and Central Asian Islamists to maintain their presence in the Pashtun dominated areas of Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas. Additionally, JUI's participation in the Pakistani government and its significant presence within Pakistani intelligence helped create and sustain a permissive environment for radical Islamists to broaden their ties to displaced Afghani males living in Pakistani refugee camps or studying in madrassas. These ties expanded dramatically with the emergence of the Taliban and allowed al-Qaida to establish a network of training bases throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan. From 1989 through 1992, ISI expanded its clandestine relationship with Arab, Central Asian and Afghan/Pakistani Islamists to support their continued proxy war against the Indian government. The Pakistani government viewed these ties as a means for their security efforts to maintain pressure on the Indian government and to tie down the Indian Army in the Kashmir and lessen the conventional military threat to Pakistan. Radical Islamists used the permissive Afghan and Pakistani territory participants of the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Somalia and the Philippines.

Taliban Emerge to Restore Stability to Afghanistan

The Taliban emerged in 1994 as a response to growing lawlessness in southern Afghanistan and popular dissatisfaction with the Kabul government. In mid-1994, warlords in the Afghan city of Kandahar reportedly were involved in the gang-rape of several Afghan boys, triggering widespread opposition to the warlords and encouraging the emergence of the Taliban.¹³³ In response to growing criminality and trade disruption

¹³³US State Department, *Finally a Talkative Talib: Origins and Membership of the Religious Students Movement*, US Embassy Islamabad, 20 February 1995.

in southern Afghanistan, Kandahari merchants reportedly financed the development of the Taliban, a militia largely comprised of madrassa students/teachers with significant military experience in resistance operations against the Soviets.¹³⁴ The Taliban, due to ties to madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, reportedly had significant support from Pakistan's JUI political party and ISI officers. The Pakistani government had grown concerned that continued instability in Afghanistan would disrupt Pakistani economic activities in Central Asia.¹³⁵ Throughout 1994, Taliban leaders claimed their movement was dedicated to restoring traditional religious norms to Afghan society and providing Islamic rule of law for the populace, a message which resonated with many Afghans weary of the civil war.

Following their emergence in Kandahar, the Taliban quickly moved to gain influence and control in southern Afghanistan and used a combination of bribes, co-option, and intimidation as well as violence to subdue Hekmatyar and rival Pashtun groups in southern Afghanistan.¹³⁶ After Kandahar, the Taliban was able to consolidate control over Oruzgan and Helmand provinces and by mid-1995 had control of 50 percent of Afghanistan and posed a threat to the ineffective government in Kabul. Taliban forces also worked to neutralize the threat that Ismail Khan, the Shi'a governor of Herat, posed to their control in southern Afghanistan. Through public outreach to the frustrated populace of Herat and well-executed military operations, the Taliban were able to

¹³⁴US State Department, *The Taliban-Who Knows What the Movement Means*, US Embassy Islamabad, 26 November 1994.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Ibid.

overwhelm Ismail Khan and force his retreat to Iran.¹³⁷ Taliban fighters captured significant stockpiles of small arms, rockets, mortars, and advanced weapons such as MIG-21 fighters and MI-8 Hip helicopters. In “liberated” areas the movement implemented a rigid form of Islamic law which forbade women to appear in public without male relatives, banned the playing of music and required men to grow beards and attend all five daily prayers at the mosque.¹³⁸

The military successes of the Taliban in 1995 led Taliban leadership under Mullah Omar to shift their strategic aims from providing stability in southern Afghanistan to a desire to “liberate” Kabul and free Afghanistan from militias and warlords through implementation of Sharia.¹³⁹ ISI supported Taliban efforts to expand their control in Afghanistan by providing training, weapons, equipment and advisors to Taliban military operations. This support improved Taliban military capabilities and allowed the Taliban to directly challenge the Afghan government’s ability to control Kabul. In the summer of 1996, Taliban forces conducted sustained indirect fire attacks against the city, causing significant civilian casualties and undermining local support for the Kabul government.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, the Taliban recruited former Afghan military officers and

¹³⁷US State Department. *Eyewitness to Fall of Herat Says Taliban and Winning Hearts and Minds—for now*, US Embassy Islamabad, 18 September 1995.

¹³⁸Maggie O’Kane, *The Guardian* 15 June 1996,
<http://www.proquest.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/> (accessed 15 January 2010).

¹³⁹US State Department, *The Taliban, What We’ve Heard*, US Embassy Islamabad, 26 January 1995.

¹⁴⁰Gerald Bourke, “Kabul Rivals Join Forces as Taliban Strikes Hard” *Guardian* 27 June 1996, 14.

pilots to employ the advanced weapons systems such as MIG-21s and helicopters.¹⁴¹

These new weapons enhanced their military capabilities and enabled the movement to overmatch the Afghan government and capture the capital in late September 1996.

The capture of Kabul emboldened the Taliban and facilitated their expansion of population control measures through enforcement of their interpretation of Sharia law. Taliban leadership used an organization known as the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice to control the populace by preventing women from working, conducting summary amputations and executions for criminal offenses, and outlawing Western influences such as music and movies.¹⁴² This effort subdued the population and limited resistance to the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan. An unintended consequence of the Taliban's implementation of Sharia was its diplomatic isolation as only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the movement. The Russian, Iranian, Indian and many Central Asian governments began arming the Tajik, Uzbek and Shi'a communities of Afghanistan in an effort to prevent the Taliban from completely overrunning Afghanistan.¹⁴³ Following the collapse of Kabul, the minority communities of Afghanistan began working together to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

¹⁴¹Ali Jalali, "Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an On-going Conflict" *Parameters* (Spring 2001): 89.

¹⁴²John Burns, "Taliban Impose Harsh Rule over Afghan Capital: Kabul Trades Fear for Severe Repression," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 1 October 1996, <http://www.proquest.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/> (accessed 15 January 2010).

¹⁴³Canadian Government, *Taliban's Challenges, Regional Concerns*, Canadian Intelligence Assessment, 18 October 1996.

Taliban military successes from 1994 to 1996 resulted in a tentative alliance between the military commanders of Afghanistan's Tajik, Uzbek and Shi'a Hazara communities. The tentative alliance later solidified and became known as the Northern Alliance due to its location in northern Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴ The key players in this alliance were the Tajik forces led by Ahmed Shah Massoud and Uzbek forces led by former Afghan Army officer Rashid Dostum. These communities began working together in late 1996 to coordinate resistance to Taliban expansion into northern Afghanistan as they had become increasingly concerned over the Taliban's long-term desires to marginalize the non-Pashtun Afghan communities. Unlike the Taliban, the Northern Alliance received limited supplies from external backers and relied primarily upon leftover weapons from resistance operations against the Soviets and supplies it could smuggle into Northern Afghanistan. Despite these equipment shortfalls, the Alliance remained fairly capable of resisting Taliban expansion from 1996 to 1998, due to its occupation of key terrain and superior military leadership.

Taliban Move to Control Afghanistan

Following their capture of Kabul, the Taliban began conducting operations to seize northern Afghanistan and consolidate Pashtun control within the country. In the first half of 1997, Taliban forces launched a series of inconclusive military campaigns north of Kabul, but Northern Alliance forces resisted effectively and prevented the attackers from seizing decisive terrain. Concurrent with their operations north of Kabul,

¹⁴⁴Northern Alliance Set to Fight Taliban with Tanks, Weapons, *The Ottawa Citizen*, 18 October 1996, <http://www.proquest.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/> (accessed 18 January 2010).

Taliban forces sought to capture Mazar-e-Sharif, a major city in northwest Afghanistan that served as the headquarters of Northern Alliance commander Rashid Dostum. One of Dostum's subordinate commanders reportedly agreed to turn over the city to Taliban forces only to change his mind and ambush large numbers of Taliban fighters, causing significant casualties.¹⁴⁵ These military setbacks forced the Taliban to assume an operational pause and led the movement to rely increasingly upon external assistance from the ISI as well as the support of groups such as Al-Qaida. The situation also delayed Taliban expansion into northern and central Afghanistan.¹⁴⁶

The Taliban conducted an operational pause through the winter of 1997 and early 1998 to prepare for a large-scale offensive in the following summer. Taliban forces reorganized, recruited additional former Afghan Pashtun military officers and acquired pickup trucks to form a light, motorized infantry force. These vehicles were divided between assault vehicles equipped with rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, and recoilless rifles, and light infantry carriers which allowed the Taliban to increase its mobility and striking power.¹⁴⁷ Pakistani external support expanded to include ISI's encouragement of Pakistani Pashtun participation in military operations as ISI sought to recruit these militants to later participate in Pakistani operations against the Indian Army

¹⁴⁵John Zubrzycki, "An Islamic revolution falters in winning Afghan hearts." *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 June 1997, Academic Search Complete, EBSCO host (accessed 18 January 2010).

¹⁴⁶Jalali, "Anatomy of an On-Going Conflict," 89-90.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 91.

in the Kashmir.¹⁴⁸ The Taliban also worked to induce defections of Northern Alliance commanders to the Taliban or to gain their neutrality during the Taliban's 1998 summer offensive to seize Mazar-e-Sharif.

This summer offensive was largely successful as Taliban forces achieved a remarkable series of victories over the Northern Alliance. These victories included the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif and other major cities in northern Afghanistan. Within weeks of the start of the campaign, the Taliban forced the Northern Alliance onto the defensive and seized key border crossings, isolating the Alliance from many of its external allies.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, the heavy fighting led many Northern Alliance members to defect or to quit fighting and to return to their homes.¹⁵⁰ The Northern Alliance had to conduct a mobile defense to prevent a complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and was unable to resume offensive operations. Despite these setbacks, the Northern Alliance retained backing from its external supporters and exploited Massoud's military skills to prevent a complete Taliban victory. By the end of 1998, the Taliban controlled nearly 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory and were able to protect Kabul from Northern Alliance military pressure.¹⁵¹ These victories enabled the Taliban to become the de-facto government of

¹⁴⁸US State Department, *Bad News on Pak/Afghan Policy: GOP Support for Taliban Appears to be Getting Stronger*, US Embassy Islamabad, 1 July 1998.

¹⁴⁹Dexter Filkins and Robin Wright. "Islamic Army Nears Victory in Afghanistan; Asia: Fundamentalist Taliban rolls over rebel positions as four-year battle for control appears to be ending," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 August 1998, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 18 January 2010).

¹⁵⁰Richard Galpin, "Taliban near Total Victory." *The Guardian*, 4 August 1998, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 18 January 2010).

¹⁵¹Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1999): 23.

Afghanistan, despite the unwillingness of the international community to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.

Taliban excesses following the 1998 summer offensive nearly triggered a war with Iran. Following their capture of Mazar-E-Sharif, Taliban forces summarily executed eleven Iranian diplomats captured in the Iranian consulate. Taliban leaders alleged these diplomats were actually Iranian intelligence officials actively supporting the Northern Alliance, a claim that likely has some merit. These executions had the unintended consequence of nearly leading to an Iranian invasion of Afghanistan. For weeks, the Iranian government demanded the return of its diplomats, mobilized nearly 200,000 members of its military and threatened to invade Afghanistan if the bodies weren't returned.¹⁵² Members of the international community, particularly the Russian government, called for the Taliban to release the diplomats and intensified pressure on Central Asian states to refrain from recognizing the Taliban as the Afghan government.¹⁵³ The Taliban's extreme activities increased the unwillingness of many governments to recognize the new Afghan government and managed to keep it isolated from the diplomatic community. It also had the effect of legitimizing the Northern Alliance by international organizations like the United Nations, preventing the Taliban from effectively representing Afghanistan in international forums.

From 1998 to 2001, the Taliban government sought to institute radical Sunni Islamist interpretations of Islamic law throughout Afghanistan. This effort antagonized Afghan minority populations in central and western Afghanistan, leading to pockets of

¹⁵²Ibid., 30.

¹⁵³Nojumi, *Rise of Taliban* 187.

resistance. Their oppression of the Shi'a Hazaras in central Afghanistan, along with their efforts to convert Shi'a Afghans to Sunni Islam, increased refugee flows into northern Afghanistan and led to increased Iranian support for the Hazara community. Taliban government officials also clamped down on Western aid organizations operating in Afghanistan by pressuring these organizations to refrain from employing women aid workers and disrupting their work. Another key policy decision of the Taliban was to promote poppy cultivation by Afghan farmers as a major source of revenue. Taliban leadership justified the cultivation of narcotics under the premise that the end product was primarily used by Westerners and permissible under Islamic law. Poppy cultivation and the subsequent export of Afghan heroin to Central Asia and Western Europe further alienated regional neighbors and led to the Taliban's designation as a major drug trafficker.¹⁵⁴

The Taliban also attempted a series of offensives to gain control of Afghanistan but proved unable to defeat Northern Alliance forces. Despite its overwhelming superiority in personnel, weapons, and financing, the movement lacked the ability to completely defeat Massoud as he was able to fight a series of desperate rear-guard actions.¹⁵⁵ Throughout much of 1999 and 2000, the Taliban fought to interdict Northern Alliance supply lines and isolate the Alliance from its Russian allies in Tajikistan. They achieved some success but found that Massoud was a competent military tactician

¹⁵⁴Hafeez Malik, "The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Its Impact on Eurasia," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1999): 140.

¹⁵⁵US State Department, *Afghanistan, Military Situation Reviewed*, American Consulate Peshawar, 12 January 2001.

capable of preventing a total defeat. It should be noted that the terrain in this part of Afghanistan favors the defense, and the Taliban was operating in areas without a Pashtun population, increasing the willingness of the locals to support the Northern Alliance against them. The situation in the summer of 2001 can largely be described as a stalemate between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban.

Taliban's Relationship with Al-Qaida Groups
Leads to US Intervention

From its inception in 1994, the Taliban leadership maintained significant ties to terrorist groups operating conducting operations against the Indian government and Islamist insurgencies in Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Many of these ties were formed in the 1980s during Afghan resistance operations against the Soviets and through ISI run Pakistani madrassas. These connections were the basis for the creation of a mutually beneficial alliance between Taliban military forces and terrorist groups conducting operations in Central Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia and Western Europe. The US, Central Asian, Russian, and Middle Eastern governments grew increasingly concerned with the activities of these terrorists and the willingness of the Taliban to provide these groups safe haven. These ties ultimately resulted in the Taliban's loss of power in Afghanistan when the US government held the movement accountable for Al-Qaida's attacks on September 11, 2001.

From 1989 to 1994, ISI officers maintained a series of training camps in eastern Afghanistan to facilitate training of Afghan and Pakistani militants involved in resistance operations against the Indian government in the disputed territory of Kashmir. Many of these recruits were ideologically aligned with Pakistan's JUI political party and would

later share similar ideology with the Taliban. The training camps were initially supported by Hekmatyar but the rise of the Taliban in 1994 and their expansion into eastern Afghanistan in 1996 caused significant ISI concern as it was unclear if the Taliban would continue to allow ISI training of militants to conduct operations in the Kashmir. The decision by senior Taliban leaders to allow ISI to continue training Kashmiri militants in eastern Afghanistan enhanced the Taliban's status with JUI and contributed to instability in the Kashmir.¹⁵⁶ Many of these Kashmiri militants maintained significant ties to al-Qaida and were involved in exporting extremism in South Asia. The Taliban and ISI also used Kashmiri militants during Taliban offensives against the Northern Alliance and provided a significant reserve force capable of supporting Taliban operations.

The professional ties between the senior leadership of al-Qaida and the Taliban expanded following al-Qaida's expulsion from the Sudan in early 1996.¹⁵⁷ Prior to this time, many senior al-Qaida figures were focused on supporting terror attacks against the West in instances such as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. They also provided support to Islamic insurgencies such as the Bosnian civil war and the Chechen resistance to Russian forces.¹⁵⁸ In the mid-1990s, the US and Saudi governments increased pressure on the Sudanese government to extradite al-Qaida leadership as part of the conditions for economic aid to the Sudan. In response to this pressure, the Sudanese government officially expelled al-Qaida leadership from the Sudan, an act which resulted in these

¹⁵⁶Rashid, "Exporting Extremism," 26.

¹⁵⁷Al-Qaida's senior leadership refers to Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.

¹⁵⁸Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe*, 18.

individuals seeking refuge in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida's senior leadership sought to exploit their historical ties to Afghan resistance figures in order to re-establish their positions of influence within Afghanistan and to build a network of training camps to prepare future terrorist attacks against Western and Middle Eastern governments.¹⁵⁹

Al-Qaida's senior leadership initially maintained a low profile following their return to Afghanistan and sought to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Despite this intention, within months, Bin Laden and Mullah Omar were in communication and it is alleged that ISI or JUI may have facilitated the contact between the Taliban and Bin Laden. The Taliban reportedly agreed to provide al-Qaida safe haven, a decision which would later cause the movement significant harm as the US government held the Taliban responsible for Al-Qaida attacks.¹⁶⁰ In return for safe haven and the freedom to operate training camps, Bin Laden provided the Taliban with secure compounds built by his engineering companies as well as a military unit known as the 55th Brigade to participate in Taliban military offensives against the Northern Alliance.¹⁶¹ The 55th Brigade was known for its tenacity in conducting military operations and its unwillingness to retreat despite military losses. These troops eventually became the Taliban shock troops during major offensives.

The Taliban's religious beliefs led them to support other Central Asian Islamist insurgent groups through the provision of safe havens in areas under Taliban control.

¹⁵⁹Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 325.

¹⁶⁰US State Department, *Taliban Decision-Making and Leadership Structure*, US Embassy Islamabad, 31 December 1998.

¹⁶¹Rashid, "Exporting Extremism," 32.

Groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Uighurs from western China were allowed to conduct training in Afghanistan and use Afghan territory as a staging area for attacks in Central Asia.¹⁶² These groups also supported Taliban offensives by providing members to participate. The Taliban's support for these various insurgent groups was a significant security challenge for many Central Asian states and facilitated the expansion of clandestine CIA activity with the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, the Russian government deployed nearly 20,000 troops to Tajikistan to maintain its border security.¹⁶³ The lack of regional support for the Taliban set the conditions for expanded US influence in Central Asia following the 11 September, 2001, attacks by Al-Qaida against the US.

Al-Qaida's use of Afghanistan as a safe haven and training facility resulted in the late 2001 US overthrow of the Taliban government. Al-Qaida planned the 1998 East Africa bombings, the 1999 Millenium bombings which were narrowly averted and the 2000 bombing of the USS *Cole* from bases in Afghanistan. These activities led to significant US pressure on the Taliban to extradite Al-Qaida's senior leadership to the US, pressure which the Afghan government ultimately rejected. Taliban senior officials stated they could not extradite al-Qaida's leadership due to Afghan tribal norms.¹⁶⁴ In response, the CIA increased its clandestine assistance to the Northern Alliance and encouraged Northern Alliance forces to actively confront Al-Qaida within Afghanistan.

¹⁶²Ibid., 23.

¹⁶³Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 456.

¹⁶⁴US State Department, *Afghanistan: Taliban Agree to Visits of Militant Training Camps, Admit UBL Their Guests*, American Consulate Peshawar, 9 January 1997.

In turn, on 9 September 2001, two Al-Qaida operatives assassinated Massoud at a Northern Alliance military facility.

Two days later, on 11 September, 2001, Al-Qaida hijacked four commercial airliners and attacked the World Trade Center in New York, and the Pentagon. US intelligence linked these attacks to Al-Qaida's senior leadership in Afghanistan, setting the stage for a direct confrontation between the US government and the Taliban.

US Response to 11 September Attacks Overthrows Taliban, Forces Movement on Defensive

The US government response to the 11 September 2001, attacks was significantly different from its actions after previous terrorist attacks targeted the US. The Bush Administration demanded the Taliban extradition of al-Qaida members to face trial in the US or face US military operations. Senior US government officials viewed the Taliban's provision of safe haven to Al-Qaida as complicity in the attack and garnered significant international support for military operations in Afghanistan. To set the stage for military operations the US government with Russian support pressured Central and South Asian governments to support US operations in Afghanistan. The US also pressed the Pakistani government, particularly ISI, to cease its aid to the Taliban and to participate in US military operations against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

Within days of the attack, the CIA and US special operations communities began planning military operations to target al-Qaida and the Taliban. In late September 2001, the CIA deployed multiple teams of intelligence operatives to link up with the Northern Alliance and establish relationships for the future conduct of irregular warfare against the

Taliban and Al-Qaida.¹⁶⁵ These initial teams focused on rebuilding relationships with Afghan resistance groups and collecting detailed intelligence on the Taliban military situation in Afghanistan. CIA's efforts to rebuild these relationships paid dividends as the US Special Forces were able to link up with the Northern Alliance and other former insurgent commanders and conduct very successful military operations against the Taliban. These military operations consisted of US close air support to Northern Alliance operations as well as training and assistance for various Afghan resistance organizations.

The decision by Taliban and Al-Qaida senior leadership to conduct a conventional defense against US operations set the stage for successful Coalition operations. Unlike the Soviet intervention in the 1980s, US military operations relied upon small numbers of US Special Forces and CIA personnel and air support working in conjunction with indigenous Afghan forces. For several weeks in October 2001, US aircraft in conjunction with Special Forces and elements of 10th Mountain Division targeted Taliban and al-Qaida troop concentrations, weakening these defensive positions and demoralizing Taliban fighters. In early November, Northern Alliance forces began a conventional ground campaign to expel Taliban forces and seize major Afghan cities such as Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Kabul.¹⁶⁶ By mid-November, all of these cities had been captured as Taliban forces disintegrated under continuous air and ground attack. The al-Qaida dominated 55th Brigade was the only Taliban affiliated organization willing to fight

¹⁶⁵Gary Schroen, *First In: An Insiders Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2005), 15.

¹⁶⁶Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York The Penguin Group, 2008), 82.

sustained military operations against the Northern Alliance or US forces.¹⁶⁷ The majority of the Taliban's senior leadership and field commanders retreated to the mountains of eastern Afghanistan or to the tribal areas of Pakistan by early December 2001. Within three months, the Northern Alliance and US forces overthrew the Taliban government and neutralized the ability of Al-Qaida to operate within Afghanistan, forcing the Taliban to revert to insurgent warfare against the transition Afghan government and Coalition forces. Despite these military successes, significant pockets of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters maintained positions in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. This presence led to the US military operation at Tora Bora in early 2002, an operation which met significant resistance from the Taliban and al-Qaida and suggested the Taliban were not as defeated as some reports indicated.

Pakistani support to the Taliban continued throughout the fall of 2001, despite significant pressure from President Bush and the US State Department. ISI provided military support consisting of weapons, training and military advice to Taliban forces preparing to conduct defensive operations against the Northern Alliance and US military offensives in September and October 2001.¹⁶⁸ Pakistani military forces also failed to secure the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, allowing thousands of Taliban and al-Qaida fighters to seek security in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This failure allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in the tribal areas of Pakistan and resulted in a reinvigorated Taliban capable of challenging Pakistani control of these areas. It also had the effect of

¹⁶⁷Schroen, *First In*, 125.

¹⁶⁸Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi. *The New Taliban: Emergence and Ideological Sanctions* (New York, Nova Science Publishers), 5.

encouraging Pakistani Pashtun to join the Taliban and conduct resistance operations in Afghanistan. Taliban fighters along with Al-Qaida terrorists operated relatively free of Pakistani government interference from late 2001 through 2004, enabling the movement to reconstitute for its continuing counteroffensive against the Afghan government and Coalition forces. In 2004, the JUI political party won significant representation in the Pakistani tribal areas, leading to official Pakistani government support for Taliban operations in the tribal areas.¹⁶⁹

The international community and the US in particular failed to exploit the rapid success of its operations in Afghanistan to rebuild Afghanistan and reconcile former Taliban fighters to the new Afghan political architecture. US military operations from 2001 through 2004 focused primarily on targeting al-Qaida and paid little attention to disrupting Taliban fighters or pressuring the Pakistani government to prevent the Taliban reconstitution in the tribal areas.¹⁷⁰ The US military also sought to limit the conventional US military footprint in the country which resulted in a minimal presence outside of Kabul. In addition, the US military in mid-2002 began planning for military operations in Iraq, leading to a reduction of US military support to the Afghan government. Coalition forces only began to move large numbers of forces into southern Afghanistan during the spring of 2006, giving the Taliban nearly five years to rebuild their infrastructure in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The limited Coalition presence in the Afghan countryside facilitated the gradual return of al-Qaida and Taliban forces, which in turn

¹⁶⁹Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, 243.

¹⁷⁰International Crisis Group, *Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No quick fixes*, Kabul, Brussels (2 November 2006), 3.

led to an increase in US air attacks in against the Taliban. An unintended consequence of US air attacks was the alienation of the Afghan populace as many of these attacks caused civilian casualties and increased local support for Taliban attacks against the Coalition.

Taliban forces in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 reverted to operations described by Mao as occurring in the first and second phasing of insurgency activity. Senior Pakistan-based Taliban field commanders began reconstituting their old networks across many areas of southern Afghanistan, activities consistent with Mao's first phase of insurgency. In 2003, Mullah Omar, the senior Taliban commander, created a Shura council to oversee Taliban resistance operations in Afghanistan and began planning future operations against Coalition forces and the Afghan government.¹⁷¹ Coalition forces commanders in Afghanistan began recovering larger caches in eastern and southern Afghanistan. International aid organizations and the UN noted Afghanistan's security continued to decline throughout 2003. While Taliban violence against Coalition forces remained at low levels, UN officials noted a growing trend of intimidation and harassment of aid workers, school teachers, and Afghan civil servants by Taliban fighters.¹⁷² The gradual decline in security led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the spring of 2006 to significantly increase European contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). These increases in troop contributions set the stage for the Taliban resumption of widespread guerrilla operations against Coalition forces and the Afghan government which began in 2005 and continues to this date.

¹⁷¹ICG, Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency, 8.

¹⁷²Ibid., 7.

Taliban Resurgence

The Taliban resurgence started in spring 2005, as their forces began reasserting military strength and overtly operating in the southern and eastern portions of Afghanistan. Attacks during this time-frame were primarily standoff harassment targeting Coalition forces but they also began to include platoon sized ambushes targeting Coalition patrols and the Afghan National Army, indicating the Taliban were conducting operating within Mao's second phase of insurgency. Another significant component of the initial Taliban resurgence was an intimidation and harassment campaign against provincial Afghan security and political officials as well as international aid organizations. This harassment was designed to isolate the populace from the Afghan government, a technique described by insurgency experts David Galula and Roger Trinquier. The failure of the Afghan government and Coalition security forces to adequately secure the populace in these targeted areas helped the Taliban to begin creating shadow governments in the Pashtun community. These shadow governments laid the groundwork for the Taliban to provide parallel governance superior to the Afghan government, a key component of the movement's strategy to delegitimize the Karzai government.¹⁷³ Taliban efforts in 2005 helped shape the operational environment for an escalation of the insurgency in the spring and summer of 2006.

The 2006 deployment of ISAF into Taliban operating environments in Helmand Province and the city of Kandahar led to a significant escalation in fighting as the Taliban conducted large-scale defensive operations in the south. In response to ISAF operations,

¹⁷³US Department of Defense, *State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions, Objectives*, International Security Assistance Forces-Afghanistan, 22 December 2009, Slide 18.

the Taliban sought to undermine Coalition resolve by causing significant casualties among the NATO contributors, especially the British, Canadian and Dutch forces.¹⁷⁴ Taliban attacks in Kandahar and Helmand provinces reportedly involved up to 1,000 fighters. Taliban propaganda officials declared they controlled 20 districts and had 12,000 fighters opposing Coalition forces. Taliban forces also made increased efforts to interdict lines of communication within Pashtun areas, making it dangerous for non-military travel at night and limiting the ability of non-governmental organizations to conduct reconstruction. In April 2006, the Pakistani government signed a peace accord with the Taliban, allowing the organization to conduct significant cross-border activities and operate safe havens free of Pakistani government interference.¹⁷⁵ A Coalition traffic accident which killed Afghans triggered widespread protests against the Afghan government and provided additional recruits for the Taliban. By the end of 2006, the Taliban had reasserted itself in historic strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan and set the stage for increasingly effective attacks against Coalition forces.

Taliban military operations in 2007 and 2008 demonstrated an ability to sustain increased levels of violence against Coalition forces. It was able to conduct lethal operations such as IED and VBIED attacks and worked in conjunction with Al-Qaida to increase the size and scope of its military operations. The international drug trade expanded Taliban financial resources during 2007 and 2008. It is estimated nearly 90

¹⁷⁴Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, 359.

¹⁷⁵ICG, “Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency,” 10.

percent of the world's opium is grown in Afghan poppy fields in southern Afghanistan.¹⁷⁶

Taliban forces in conjunction with al-Qaida conducted a large-scale attack against a Coalition patrol base in eastern Afghanistan and nearly overran the facility, causing the deaths of nine US soldiers and the eventual evacuation of the facility. European members of NATO were increasingly vulnerable to Taliban attacks; in August 2008, Taliban forces ambushed and killed 10 French soldiers and released video of the attack as part of their propaganda campaign to weaken Coalition resolve.¹⁷⁷ These efforts appear to have been partially successful as the British commander in Helmand and the French Chief of Staff publicly stated they believed the war in Afghanistan was not winnable through military means.¹⁷⁸ During the 2007 to 2008 time-frame, the movement also began expanding its operations north towards Kabul and west towards cities such as Mazar-e-Sharif in an effort to challenge the ability of the Afghan government to control major population centers.¹⁷⁹ By the end of 2008 Taliban forces were able to successfully engage Afghan security forces and Coalition forces were unable to prevent the continued insurgent expansion into areas with a Pashtun population.

In 2009, the Taliban resumed widespread insurgent operations across the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and demonstrated increased tactical proficiency when engaging

¹⁷⁶Shahid Asfar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, "The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis," *Military Review* 88, no. 3 (May-June 2008): 63.

¹⁷⁷Michael Yon, "Road to Hell," 13 October 2008, <http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-road-to-hell.htm>.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹AFCEA Intelligence, "Nightwatch Special Report, October 2008 in Afghanistan" John McCreary, 15 December 2008, 3.

Coalition forces. The Taliban provided superior governance for the Pashtun population in many areas of Afghanistan, a fact that undermines the credibility of the Afghan government.¹⁸⁰ An unclassified ISAF intelligence study on the state of the Taliban currently assesses that the Taliban maintains shadow governments for 33 of 34 Afghan provinces (see figure below). Coalition casualties in Afghanistan rose dramatically in 2009, and Taliban forces conducted multiple effective attacks against Coalition patrols and firebases. Despite the Taliban's escalation of violence, the group remained primarily concentrated in the Pashtun provinces of the country and demonstrated a limited ability to project power into areas with minority Pashtun populations. Coalition forces and the Afghan government responded to the escalation in violence by preparing a surge of troops into Afghanistan but were countered by a Taliban information operations message which stressed "The Americans have the watch, the Taliban have the time" to discourage Afghan support for the Kabul government. President Obama's speech on 1 December 2009, which announced a surge of 30,000 US military members on an 18 month timeline, seemed to reinforce Taliban perceptions of the unwillingness of the US military to conduct long-term Afghan operations. The Afghan government, with the support of the Coalition, has attempted to reach out to Taliban leaders at the district and local level in an effort to split the Taliban and offset their military gains. These efforts are likely to shape future Taliban operations and may result in a significant change in Taliban strategy in the first part of 2010. The figure below is derived from an unclassified ISAF briefing on the

¹⁸⁰Griff White, "Taliban Shadow Officials Offer Concrete Alternative," *Washington Post*, 8 December 2009, 1.

state of the Taliban insurgency and paints a stark picture of the security environment in Afghanistan.




Figure 1. State of Afghan Insurgency

Source: US Department of Defense, State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions, Objectives, International Security Assistance Forces-Afghanistan, 22 December 2009, Slide 18

2010 Outlook

The Taliban are likely to adopt an operational pause through the first part of spring 2010 to observe the Coalition surge and plan future operations. This operational pause is likely to lead to a decrease in overall levels of violence, however, it should be noted this reduction in violence is not likely to equate to a corresponding lack of capability. It is also probable that the Taliban will continue their high-profile attacks which generate media coverage and call into question the ability of the Kabul government to control Afghanistan. The Taliban are responding to Coalition efforts to

secure the support of the Afghan populace by issuing new directives on Taliban interaction with the local population and have set strict guidelines for the conduct of Taliban fighters when confronting Afghans who have worked with the Coalition.¹⁸¹ These new directives indicate the Taliban are aware that their more extreme activities alienate local Afghans and are seeking to offset Coalition outreach by improving their image among the Afghans. They are primarily playing upon Pashtun codes of conduct to gain new recruits and maintain freedom of movement in southern Afghanistan.

Afghan and Coalition outreach to Taliban moderates is likely to have some success but it is also likely to face significant challenges. Within the Pashtun community there is a long-established history of resistance to foreign occupation and anecdotal reporting indicates religiously motivated Taliban fighters are unlikely to work with an Afghan government which is seen as overly corrupt and tied to Western influence.¹⁸² The fighters and Taliban leaders most likely to be receptive to this outreach are those motivated to work with the Taliban for monetary reasons or due to their frustration with perceived slights from the Afghan government. While Afghan loyalties to various militia and insurgent groups have been largely fluid throughout the years, it remains unclear how many Taliban are going to be willing to split from the group and renounce violence. An additional challenge is that Coalition forces and the Afghan government lack a viable partner within the Pashtun community to confront Taliban extremists. Without the emergence of an indigenous group beyond Afghan security forces, the Taliban will

¹⁸¹ISAF, State of the Insurgency, Slide 6.

¹⁸²Sami Yousafvi and Ron Moreau, “The Taliban in Their Own Words,” *Newsweek*, 26 September 2009, 7.

remain able to retaliate against Taliban members who cease their operations against the Kabul government.

CHAPTER 5

APPLICABILITY OF CURRENT DOCTRINE TO CASE STUDIES

US Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Hizballah, and the Taliban

This chapter compares the Hizballah and Taliban case studies and US counterinsurgency doctrine in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of current doctrine and Islamist insurgencies. Both of these actors are well-established threat operating in the Middle East and South Asia, regions of the world with significant importance to US strategic interest. Because of the threat these groups pose, it is worth examining how applicable current doctrine is to describing the nature of these groups. US counterinsurgency doctrine has strengths for understanding the nature of groups such as Hizballah and the Taliban but it also has weaknesses which need to be corrected to reflect the nature of Islamist insurgencies.

Applicability of US Doctrine to Hizballah and the Taliban

An analysis of the applicability of JP 3-24 to the Hizballah and Taliban case studies reveals that joint doctrine has important utility to understanding the threat posed by the movements to US government interests in the Middle East and Afghanistan. JP 3-24 effectively describes the organization and components of an insurgency, and perhaps more importantly, describes the organization of an insurgency into political and military wings.¹⁸³ Both case studies demonstrate that Islamist insurgencies are often broken into a political wing that is heavily dominated by religious authorities and a military wing of

¹⁸³Department of Defense, JP 3-24, II-18.

fighters conducting guerrilla activity against military forces. An additional aspect of JP 3-24 that is relevant for both case studies is the importance external support has to the success of an insurgency. Both Hizballah and the Taliban have been successful due to the external support they have received from Iran and Pakistan respectively.¹⁸⁴

Another aspect of JP 3-24 that is very much relevant to both case studies is discussion of identity-based insurgency and its use of religious or ethnic identity as the basis of recruitment for the movements support within the populace. The Hizballah and Taliban case studies both exhibit strong identity motivations and their information operations narratives exploit these themes to help the movements build their base of support. Hizballah in particular has used the Shi'a religious identity as a powerful component of its information operations strategy to build support in the Shi'a community and legitimize itself as a religious organization as well as an insurgency. The Taliban have also used the Islamist nature of the movement as well as their Pashtun identity to recruit support in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Joint doctrine discussion of this aspect of insurgency provides a common understanding between the services and applicable to both case studies.

An additional aspect of JP 3-24 that fits the Hizballah and Taliban case studies is the manual's discussion of the desired endstate of an insurgency. JP 3-24 breaks these down into four main desired endstates: seeking to change an economic or political system, overthrow an established government, resist occupation, or nullify the government's control of the state.¹⁸⁵ Hizballah emerged as a group seeking to resist

¹⁸⁴Ibid., II-11.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., II-4.

Israeli occupation of Lebanon as well as change the religious and political system. The group also seeks to nullify the government's control of the state as part of its strategy to ultimately transform Lebanese society. The Taliban are seeking the overthrow of the Karzai government, but also oppose what they believe is a foreign occupation by Coalition forces which is seeking to remove Islam from Afghan society.

FM 3-24 and its derivative, FM 3-24.2, have applicability to both case studies and are very similar to joint doctrine, mainly due to the fact that JP 3-24 was published nearly two years after FM 3-24. The breakdown in both FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2 of an insurgency into five broad categories: leadership, guerrillas, the underground, auxiliaries, and the mass base is applicable to Hizballah and the Taliban.¹⁸⁶ Hizballah is much more complex than a band of terrorists and guerrillas; the broad-based social services provided in Beirut and southern Lebanon have enabled the development of a large underground and auxiliary component of the movement to provide passive and active support to Hizballah's military activities. It is also worth noting Hizballah's military wing is a small component of the overall movement. The Taliban show aspects of similar organization as the madrassa network is a key enabler of their activities and has helped build their support in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

FM 3-24 accurately describes how external support is an enabler for insurgencies and the various types of outside support available to insurgents. From its inception, Hizballah received significant external support from Iran and Syria. This support includes financing, weapons, safe haven, and training camps for Hizballah fighters. External support, as described in Chapter 4, has played an important role in enabling the Taliban

¹⁸⁶US Army, FM 3-24.2, 2-2 to 2-6.

to progress from a small group of religious students and clerics to an insurgency which seized control of the Afghan government in 1996. Additionally, external support was a key enabler of follow-on Taliban operations from 1996 through 2001 which sought to consolidate Taliban control over Afghanistan. This consisted of Pakistani government provision of financing, personnel and weapons funneled through ISI as well as similar support from non-state actors such as Al-Qaida. These documents highlight the effect political and resource support, when combined with sanctuary and training can have upon the ability of an insurgency to adapt to counterinsurgency operations.

Doctrinal Challenges in Explaining Islamic Insurgencies

An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of both joint and Army counterinsurgency doctrine shows that US doctrine has three areas in which it fails to provide a complete and accurate picture of the nature of Hizballah and the Taliban. The first major deficiency is an inadequate discussion of the nature and motivations of identity and religious based insurgencies. This is particularly true of Islamist insurgencies which are motivated by a desire to protect traditional ways of life and religious identity from what is perceived to be corrupting influences from the West as well as expand the role of Islam in society. Stephen Biddle argues in a 2006 *Foreign Affairs* magazine article that US understanding of the Iraq insurgency is tainted by an overreliance upon Maoist insurgency doctrine which is primarily dominated by a desire for political change, and ignores the influence religion and ethnicity are playing in Iraq's violence.¹⁸⁷ The second major area for consideration is the changing nature of insurgent phasing in a post Cold

¹⁸⁷Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006), 2.

War operational environment. During the Cold War, it was common for insurgencies to evolve to Mao's third stage of insurgency and conduct conventional warfare in an effort to overthrow the government. However, as the Hizballah case study and the current operations of the Taliban show these insurgencies are seeking to wear down Coalition resolve rather than force their military defeat as these insurgencies are more interested in transforming society and lack the capabilities to confront the West in a long-term conventional military campaign.

Reconsidering the Power of Religion and Identity Motivations

Counterinsurgency doctrine identifies religion as an important factor influencing the current operational environment and creating schisms between ineffective governments and the host populations. It also states that religion is a powerful motivation for insurgents, yet, it avoids discussing the reality that many within the Middle East view religion in a manner different than Western societies. Bernard Lewis, a well-established Middle East historian, notes that Islamists in the Middle East fundamentally reject Western ideals of secularism and believe that “no man can change or alter the laws of God” that are present in the Koran and other Islamist religious writings.¹⁸⁸ Another major consideration with regards to the importance of religion is the reality that failed and failing states are often unable to provide basic services for significant segments of the population, a gap which filled by Islamic organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hizballah in Lebanon, or the Sadr movement within Iraq.

¹⁸⁸Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002), 100-101.

The Afghanistan case study revealed the role that mosque networks and madrassas play in fulfilling the educational and spiritual needs of the Afghan and Pakistani populations. Lewis also notes Islamist movements seek to prevent the spread of these secular reforms within society, and are motivated by a belief that they must restore the past successes of the Ottoman Empire. Faoud Ajami, in his book *The Arab Predicament*, links the resurgence of Islamist movements in Lebanon and Palestine to the failure of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s to defeat the Israeli government during the 1967 Six Days War. The failure to defeat Israel discredited Arab nationalists and led many to question the viability of Arab governments to improve living conditions or defeat the Israeli government.¹⁸⁹

The Hizballah case study is a great example of an insurgency that skillfully harnessed the Shi'a political and religious mobilization started by Musa al-Sadr and Amal to emerge as a major Middle Eastern power player. Al-Sadr's mobilization of the Shi'a community through religious education and socioeconomic outreach fundamentally altered the Lebanese political landscape as it led to the emergence of a vocal Shi'a community willing to advocate its interests. The Lebanese civil war and 1982 Israeli invasion created a need within the Shi'a community for a group capable of defending the Shi'a community from the Israelis and sectarian rivals. This need for protection, coupled with the Hizballah's efforts to advance the socio-economic standing of the Shi'a community, has further embedded Hizballah within the Shi'a political landscape. Additionally, its success in confronting the Israelis in the 1990s and 2006 solidified the

¹⁸⁹Faoud Ajami, *The Arab Predicament Arab Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 56.

resistance credentials of the movement and led many Shi'a to identify with successful military resistance to Israeli occupation. Hizballah's political documents contain many references to Islamic and Shi'a religious history and link Hizballah to Shi'a religious history.

The Taliban are an insurgency which has successfully exploited the Afghan populace's mobilization in response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Efforts by the Afghan government to replace Afghan tribal society with a Soviet-style socialist society triggered a tribal and religious mobilization to prevent the destruction of traditional Afghan society. This tribal and religious mobilization, particularly in the Pashtun community, facilitated the 1994 Taliban emergence to restore order within the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban quickly moved to expand Pashtun control in Afghanistan and establish an Islamic government to govern the country. Many conservative religious leaders within the Pashtun community, along with Afghan tribal leaders supported the emergence of the Taliban and its expansion of power throughout the mid 1990s.

The successful US invasion of Afghanistan in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center forced the Taliban on the defensive following a series of Taliban military defeats in late 2001. Despite their military setbacks, the Taliban from 2002 to the present have mobilized significant elements within the Pashtun community to oppose the Afghan government which is comprised of Pashtun ethnic rivals. The Taliban have proven to be quite capable of playing upon Pashtun concerns over Western efforts to democratize Afghanistan and empower women to retain support in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Efforts to expand Afghan government control and

advance women's rights pose a direct threat to the power base of Pashtun tribal leaders and the Taliban's expressed mission of preventing an expansion of this control has helped to legitimize the Taliban in many parts of southern Afghanistan.

The Hizballah and Taliban case studies demonstrate the strength of insurgencies motivated by religion or identity and the challenge these motivations place upon counterinsurgency efforts. Islamist insurgencies combine the political and religious leadership into the political wing of the movement, a reality that complicates the ability of the counterinsurgent to target the political wing of the movement. Efforts by the Israelis and Coalition forces to target the religious wing of Hizballah and the Taliban only reinforce the insurgent's narrative that they are engaged in a fight for the survival of their religion and identity. This reality greatly complicates efforts to target the political aspects of the movement and is a direct contrast to Cold War Maoist insurgencies which had defined political wings which sought to mobilize targeted audiences by appealing to political or economic motivations, not cultural or religious identity.

Evolution of Insurgency Phasing

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s fundamentally changed the operational environment around the world and had an impact upon the nature of insurgency. Several theorists in the late 1980s began to postulate that warfare was shifting from conventional military conflicts to a more amorphous type of conflict which would combine conventional and unconventional warfare as adversaries of major Western powers sought new methods to fight against the major military powers. This theory became known as fourth-generation warfare and was predicted by some to represent the nature of conflict in a post Cold War operational environment. The

theorists' major thesis was that fourth generation warfare adversaries sought to collapse enemy will to fight, rather than to seek a decisive military victory.¹⁹⁰ Interestingly, this view is consistent with the indirect approach favored by Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu and with Mao's emphasis on protracted warfare.

These theorists also argued that the distinction between civilians and military would diminish and that the tactical and strategic levels of warfare would begin to blend. Additionally, in a fourth generation conflict, information operations would become much more important than it had been previously as the adversaries of the US would use aggressive strategic communications and psychological operations to weaken the resolve of the US populace to sustain long-term military commitments. While this viewpoint remains very controversial, it should be noted that Hizballah and the Taliban exhibit multiple characteristics of what could be described as fourth generation warfare.

Hizballah's insurgency against the Lebanese government and Israeli forces has demonstrated a unique adaptation to the Maoist model present within current doctrine and is likely to be the new model in which Islamist insurgencies operate. The group has built conventional military capabilities and shadow governance consistent with Mao's third stage of insurgency, yet it has refrained from toppling the Lebanese government. Hizballah also added modern weapons systems to its arsenal and operate more as a nation-state than an insurgent or terrorist group. Hizballah's restraint towards the Lebanese government is likely indicative of a desire to avoid alienating sectarian rivals or prompting Western intervention in Lebanon, not a reflection of a lack of military

¹⁹⁰William S Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): 22.

capability. An additional permutation of insurgent phasing is that Hizballah is now providing external support to the Shi'a insurgency in Iraq and the Palestinian insurgency against Israel.

Hizballah and the Taliban also exhibit another interesting permutation of insurgency phasing with regards to their conduct of military operations against Coalition counterinsurgents supporting host-nation government. Throughout the 1980s, Hizballah actively sought to isolate the Lebanese government by targeting the US, French, British and Israeli governments with car bombings and kidnappings. This isolation subverted the government's influence within Lebanon and helped set the conditions for Hizballah to emerge as a major power player within Lebanese political society.

The Taliban have also demonstrated a similar strategy during their operations in an effort to set conditions for what they believe will be a Taliban victory in the long-term. Taliban forces have systematically targeted individual country contributors to ISAF as part of their effort to break Coalition resolve. From 2006 through the present, Taliban forces in Kandahar province have actively targeted Canadian forces in an effort to create sufficient Coalition casualties to result in their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Another example of Taliban efforts to create disunity between Coalition forces is their reported agreement in 2008 with Italian forces.¹⁹¹ This agreement stipulated the Taliban would refrain from attacking ISAF in the Italian sector in exchange for the Italian government payments of protection money. This reported agreement created significant tension

¹⁹¹"Italy Bribed Taliban All Over Afghanistan, Fresh Claims as Row Over Death of 10 French Soldiers Escalates," *Daily Mail*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1220813/Embarrassment-Italy-Taliban-commander-confirms-protection-payments-prevent-attacks-troops.html> (accessed 26 February 2010).

between the French and Italian contingents as 10 French soldiers were killed following the turnover of the Italian sector to the French in 2008. Taliban targeting of the Dutch military contingent undermined Dutch public support for continued operations in Afghanistan and on 21 February 2010, the Dutch government announced it would withdraw forces from Afghanistan at the end of the year.¹⁹² The Dutch withdrawal is significant as it removes a major troop contributor to ISAF. In the future, it is likely other insurgencies will use this tactic against Coalition counterinsurgency efforts as insurgents believe they can effectively undermine the resolve of Coalition forces to sustain a counterinsurgency effort.

Hizballah and to a lesser extent the Taliban represent what is likely to be the new face of insurgency in the 21st century. Both insurgencies have attempted to conduct conventional warfare consistent with the third stage of insurgency described by Mao in *On Guerrilla Warfare*. In both cases, these efforts were a failure due to the insurgent's inability to overcome superior Israeli and Coalition firepower. Both insurgencies have achieved high levels of success when they employed guerrilla tactics, limited mobile warfare and subversion consistent with Mao's second phase of insurgency warfare. Additionally, their effective linkage of tribal or ethnic identity to Islam has enabled them to create a powerful narrative through which they can mobilize significant elements of the populace. Hizballah through its development of parallel governance in Lebanon and maintenance of a semi-conventional military force has largely achieved its goals of expanding influence and power throughout the Shi'a community and within Lebanon.

¹⁹²Ian Traynor, "NATO Afghanistan Mission in Doubt After Dutch Withdrawal," *The Guardian* (accessed 22 February 2010).

Despite its significant unpopularity, the Taliban has been fairly successful at mobilizing significant elements of Afghanistan's Pashtun community by leveraging tribal and religious leaders' fears of diminished influence and power in a democratic Afghanistan. Both insurgencies seem less focused on militarily defeating Western forces as they are on undermining popular support in West and forcing an eventual withdrawal of Coalition forces.

The Way Forward

The current gaps in US doctrine on the unique challenges posed by religious and identity motivated insurgencies as opposed to more traditional politically motivated insurgencies necessitate a reconsideration of the role of religion/identity in creating and sustaining insurgencies. As previously described, doctrine states that religion is an important and at times critical motivation with regards to insurgency, but there is a deliberate omission of the conflict between Islamists and their desire to create Islamic societies and Western efforts to support democracy in Lebanon and Afghanistan. While it is important that the US government refrain from feeding insurgent narratives of a "Clash of Civilizations," it is also worth noting there are legitimate differences in how societies view religion and the importance religion has upon daily life. Ignoring the fundamental tension between US efforts to create secular governance and the efforts of Islamists to create an Islamic society does not negate the fact that this is an essential component of conflict the US and its allies are facing in the Middle East.¹⁹³

¹⁹³Ralph Peters, "Progress and Peril, New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on History Exam," *Armed Forces Journal*, <http://afji.com/2007/02/2456854> (accessed 26 February 2010).

Western society may accept the separation of Church and State, but within the Middle East this idea is viewed as a direct attack upon the Islamists' conception of society. Many Islamists regard secularism as a direct attack upon their religion and a threat due to the lack of separation of Church and State within Islam. As David Kilcullen argues in his latest book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, many insurgencies in the Middle East are a direct response to perceptions that the West is fundamentally seeking to transform their society. Until the US government is willing to have serious discussions at the strategic level on the impact this type of conflict has upon our national security and military strategies, doctrine is going to struggle to describe the nature of the conflict with which US forces are involved.

The Department of Defense can address the challenge of improving its ability to understand Islamist insurgencies by increasing the number of military officers and intelligence professionals sent to study at advanced Middle Eastern studies programs. G2/S2 field grade officers, as well as warrant officers, provide significant intelligence support to commanders conducting battle command. However, many of these officers often have limited opportunities for advanced education related to the Middle Eastern history or politics. The Army should consider adopting an education program within the military intelligence career field similar to the foreign area officer program and send certain officers with demonstrated aptitude to these advanced educational establishments. Attendance at these schools would improve the quality of intelligence analysis of issues such as Islamic political thought and the political aspects of an insurgency, improving the ability of commanders to "Understand, Visualize and Describe" the nature of the threats they are currently facing. These institutions also build Arabic language capabilities as

they require each student to demonstrate a proficiency in foreign languages as part of their graduation requirements. Another benefit of attending these schools would be the interaction between US security officials and Middle Eastern students which would allow both sides to learn from each other.

An additional way to improve the military's current understanding of Islamist insurgencies would be to allow military officers and intelligence professionals with Iraq and Afghanistan experience to take sabbaticals and publish strategic level assessments of the nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly, such personnel could use sanitized intelligence and operational reporting to write unclassified, in-depth assessments of insurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This should result in the publication of documents which guide the development of future doctrine. Many of the intelligence documents and operational information necessary for writing these documents will become less sensitive as Coalition forces begin to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. This research and study should be done in conjunction with the Combat Studies Institute and the Foreign Military Studies Office, similar to the work conducted on the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets during the late 1980s.

An examination of these conflicts is likely to result in modified doctrinal language on the nature of insurgency phasing. This modified language is likely to move away from the Maoist model of insurgent phasing to a model which suggests that some Islamist insurgencies may never seek the overthrow of a constituted government but instead focus on building a parallel society to gradually transform society over the long-term. This threat is probably best epitomized by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which has abandoned violent actions against the Egyptian government but continues to build its

shadow government capability while simultaneously increasing its political influence through the democratic process.¹⁹⁴ This pseudo-insurgency, while not a focus of the US military, is likely to continue emerging as a major challenge to US national interests in the mid-term.

The last and potentially most important issue meriting discussion within doctrine is the growing willingness of insurgents to directly target US allies during Coalition operations. Hizballah effectively targeted Coalition forces in the 1980s and the Taliban has shown it is deliberately targeting Coalition partners it believes are vulnerable to domestic pressure. Leadership within Hizballah and the Taliban seem to be quite aware that some European partners are extremely vulnerable to domestic political pressure and are willing to exploit these divisions to undermine Coalition resiliency. Similarly, al-Qaida used terror attacks in Spain to force the withdrawal of the Spanish contingent from Iraq.¹⁹⁵

To counter the ability of insurgents to use this tactic, US planners, working with Coalition partners, should ensure our allies vulnerable to domestic pressure are not placed in positions where they can suffer major losses. The placement of Coalition partners in southern Afghanistan has had strategic consequences as the British and Canadian contingents have suffered casualties which have greatly undermined the national resolve of both countries to continue aggressive operations. Understanding the political ramifications of Coalition partner casualties should result in more detailed planning on

¹⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Integration or Conflagration?” Middle East/North Africa Report N°76 – (18 June 2008).

¹⁹⁵ Simon Jeffery, “New Spanish PM Promises Iraq Withdrawal,” *The Guardian*, 15 March 2004.

the exact role and mission of Coalition partners in US-led Coalition operations to prevent insurgents from undermining Coalition resiliency.

Addressing these doctrinal shortfalls and challenges will not solve the complexity of countering Islamist insurgencies nor serve as a magic answer to the problem; however, it should enable improved application of Battle Command and Operational Design to solve complex problems. Islamist insurgencies fit the categorization as complex problems for military commanders to understand and reliance upon current doctrinal descriptions of the insurgency environment is likely to lead many to underestimate the power of religion as a motivating factor for these insurgencies and could result in the employment of ineffective counterinsurgency strategies.¹⁹⁶ A solid educational base for military officers and intelligence professionals, when combined with updated doctrine to describe the threat posed by Islamist insurgencies is likely to be a powerful tool for understanding the threat from these Islamist insurgencies. No two insurgencies are the same, however, an improved educational base and ability to understand the operational variables is likely to increase the likelihood of developing counterinsurgency strategies appropriate to the threat environment US forces are likely to face for the foreseeable future.

¹⁹⁶T.C. Greenwood and T.X. Hammes, “War Planning for Wicked Problems, Where Joint Doctrine Fails,” *Armed Forces Journal*, <http://www.afji.com/2009/12/4252237> (accessed: 26 February 2010).

APPENDIX A

ATTENDEES OF RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY SEMINAR

LT. COL. Charles T. R. Bohannan, AUS-RET., was intimately associated with the major events in the Philippines in the last two decades, playing an important role, in particular, in the struggle against the communist (Hukbalahap) insurgent movement of the postwar period. A geologist, archaeologist and cartographer prior to his enlistment in the US Army in 1941, he saw combat in various Pacific theaters during World War II and took part in the liberation of the Philippine Islands from the Japanese. He returned to the newly independent Philippine Republic in 1946 and, for the next three years, participated in the anti-Huk campaign as a counterintelligence officer, thus gaining firsthand, authoritative knowledge of the nature of guerrilla warfare and the principles and techniques of counterinsurgency. In the later phases of the campaign, he served in Manila as JUSMAG advisor on unconventional operations to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Col. Bohannan coauthored with COL. Napoleon D. Valeriano, *Counterguerrilla Operations: Lessons from the Philippines*, published by Frederick A. Prager, Inc., New York, 1962.

COL. Wendell W. Fertig, USA-RET., won a great distinction during World War II as a guerrilla leader in the Philippines. A mining engineer and army reserve officer, he was superintendent of the largest iron mine in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war, when he volunteered for active duty with the Corps of Engineers of the Philippines Department of the US Army. After the fall of the Philippines, Col. Fertig organized and commanded the Philippine-American guerrilla forces on Mindanao and during the next three years of the Japanese occupation, developed them into a highly trained and effective

force. His efforts did much to pave the way for the return of the American forces to Mindanao in 1945. Between the end of the war and his retirement from the service in 1956, Col. Fertig's assignments included a tour as professor of military science and tactics at the Colorado School of Mines (1947-1951), the post of Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army (1951-1953); and that of Deputy Director of the Joint Staff of PROVMAAG-Korea (1954-1955). He was a frequent lecturer on guerrilla and psychological warfare and issued a number of publications on the subject.

Lt. Col. David Galula had an unusually wide variety of experience in a number of theaters in revolutionary warfare. Having graduated from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr in 1940, he served in North Africa, France, and Germany during World War II. From 1945-1948 he was posted to China (part of that period as Assistant Military Attaché), and thus was able to acquaint himself firsthand with communist guerrilla strategy and tactics in the civil war. In 1949/1950 Col Galula was a military observer with the UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) during the civil war in Greece, which ended with the defeat of the communist rebellion. He subsequently served for nearly five years as his country's Military Attaché in Hong Kong. In 1956, at the height of the Algerian rebellion, Col. Galula was given command of a company assigned to the district of Kabylie, east of Algiers, an area of intensive FLN operations, which he succeeded in clearing militarily and returning to government control the two years of his command. From 1958 until he came to the United States in April 1962, except for six months spent at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, Col Galula worked at general military headquarters in Paris on various aspects of unconventional warfare

and in, particular, the war in Algeria. In the spring of 1962 he joined the Center of International Affairs at Harvard University as a research associate.

Capt. Anthony S. Jeapes took an active part in counterinsurgent campaigns in Malaya and the Middle East. A graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, he was commissioned into the Dorset Regiment in 1955, and shortly thereafter went with his battalion to Germany as part of the 4th Infantry Division. His next post two years later was that of instructor to a "Junior Leaders" unit at Plymouth, England. In 1958 he was selected to attend the Special Air Service course in Wales and joined the elite 22nd SAS Regiment in the campaign against the Chinese terrorists in Malaya. The special function of that regiment, for which its members were carefully selected and trained, consisted in having small units penetrate the guerrilla-infested deep jungle to spot and ambush terrorist concentrations and collect intelligence from the aborigines inhabiting the areas. In 1959 Capt. Jeapes participated in the defeat of the rebellion in Oman, before returning to the United Kingdom with the 22nd SAS.

Lt. Col. Frank E. Kitson, MBE. MC, took part in the British counterinsurgency campaigns in both Kenya and Malaya. Having spent his first seven years as an officer of the British infantry chiefly in occupied Germany, he was posted to Kenya in mid-1953, at the height of the Mau-Mau rebellion. His primary task was to help the intelligence branch of the police to obtain the information needed by the security forces in their fight against the terrorist gangs. In the course of the next two years Col Kitson developed and perfected a novel approach and technique for the collection and utilization of the special kind of intelligence that is indispensable in guerrilla warfare. He was also able subsequently to apply this experience in the anti-terrorist campaign in Malaya, where he

had command of an infantry company in 1957. In recent years Col. Kitsons assignments have included a year at the British Army Staff Colelge at Camberley; a post in the Military Operations Branch of the War Office, responsible for the Middle East; a tour as army instructor at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich England; and several months at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk Virginia. Col Kitson recorded his experience in Kenya in a book entitled *Gangs and Counter-gangs* published by Barrie and Rockliff, London, 1960.

BRIG. GEN. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, who became an officer in the US Army in 1943 after having served with the Office of Strategic Services, was involved in many of the insurgent and counterinsurgent efforts that have concerned the United States in the early years of the Cold War. From 1945 until 1958 he was Chief of the Intelligence Division at Headquarters AFWESPAC in the Philippines (later the Philippines Ryukyus Command). He returned to the Philippines in 1950 to become the JUSMAG liaison officer, and, in the course of time, a close personal friend and advisor to newly appointed Secretary of Defense Magsaysay. In that capacity he helped the Philippine Armed Forces develop psychological operations, civic action, and prisoner-rehabilitation programs in the struggle against the communist Huks. Later in Southeast Asia, Gen. Lansdale was an advisor on special counterguerrilla operations on General O-Daniel's mission to the French forces in Indochina (1953). He subsequently served with MAAG-Vietnam in Saigon (1954-1956), advising the Vietnamese government on internal security problems, psychological operations, intelligence, civic action, and the refugee program, and in the process became a close personal friend of President Diem. After 1957 Gen. Lansdale served in a number of posts in Washington. He became Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense in 1957; joined the staff of the President's Committee on Military Assistance in 1959; and in 1961 was appointed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He died in 1987.

Rufus C. Phillips, III had an impressive background in the fields of psychological warfare and civil action in Southeast Asia. In the middle 1950s, as a member of the Military Aid Advisory Group and psychological warfare advisor to the Army of South Vietnam, he was responsible for organizing the Vietnamese Army's psychological warfare branch and also had a major role in the pacification operations in the previously communist-held areas of South Vietnam. In 1957, Mr. Phillips went to Laos and spent the next two years working with the Lao government in launching and directing a "civic action" program that was designed, much like the earlier effort in Vietnam, to win the loyalty of the population in rural areas for the legitimate government and away from the communists through political, economic and psychological means. After an interim of three years with a private firm of consulting engineers in Washington, DC., Mr. Phillips returned to Southeast Asia once again. In September 1962, following a brief assignment for AID to survey counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam and draft an AID program in support of counterinsurgency, he was appointed Assistant Director for Rural Affairs/Counterinsurgency, USOM/Saigon.

BRIG. David Leonard Powell-Jones, DSO, OBE, had a distinguished and varied military career and has served in a number of theaters of war in the Middle and Far East. An officer in the Indian Army, he was transferred in 1947, at the time of independence, to the Brigade of Gurkhas that was retained in the British service. During World War II he served in the Middle East from 1939 until 1941, participating in campaigns in the

Western Desert, Eritrea, and Syria. He then returned to India, and from there was posted to Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. He acquired extensive experience of the problems and tactics of modern counterinsurgency during the emergency in Malaya, where he had a prominent part in the British operations against the communist terrorists. He served as a battalion commander in Malaya from 1953 until 1956 and as commander of a brigade from 1957 to the end of 1958. The following year, Brig. Powell-Jones attended the Imperial Defense College in London. His numerous appointments in intelligence and planning included a tour as member of the International Planning Team in the NATO Standing Group in Washington (1951-1953), and the post of Director of Plans both in the War Office (1960/1961) and in the Ministry of Defense (1961).

COL. John R. Shirley, OBE, had wide experience in the area of counterguerrilla warfare, primarily from the point of view of the operations-research specialist and expert in communications. His training at the Army Signal School in New Zealand, the Digla Signal School in Egypt, and the Catterick Signal School in England laid the foundations for his active career in the fields of electronics and military tactics. After World War II Col. Shirley's assignments included that of director of British Army operations research in Western Europe, with responsibility for the scientific support of the Northern Army Group, a task oriented to the requirements of a large-scale war. Thereafter, his efforts in the service of the British government were directed predominantly toward the demands of limited warfare, including problems of counterinsurgency. Thus Col. Shirley directed an operations-research team in Malaya in the mid-1950s during a critical phase of the British campaign against the communist terrorists, with particular attention to the improvement of weapons and communications. Subsequently he served as a leader of a technical group

that was sent to Kenya to investigate similar problems in the campaign against the Mau Mau rebellion.

COL. Napoleon D. Valeriano, a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy and the US Cavalry School, had a distinguished career as an officer in the service of the US and the Republic of the Philippines, in the course of which he became intimately involved in both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. At the time of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines he was serving on the headquarters staff of the 31st Infantry Reserve Division during the Bataan Campaign. After the surrender Col Valeriano served with the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces on Luzon until General MacArthur's return in 1945, when he joined the 1st Cavalry Division Staff of the Sixth Army and participated in the Philippines liberation campaign. Among his numerous staff and command positions after the war was that of commander of the 7th Battalion Combat Team, which achieved spectacular results under his leadership in the 1949/1950 against the communist Huk guerrillas on Luzon. Col Valeriano subsequently served as military assistant to President Magsaysay; commander of the Presidential Guards Battalion; Secretary to the Philippine National Security Council; and national Security Co-coordinator for the Philippines. From 1954-1955 he was in South Vietnam on loan to the US Military Mission. Thereafter he became the Philippine Military Attaché in Thailand and his country's military representative to SEATO Secretariat. Col. Valeriano resigned his commission in 1957. He was co-author, with Lt. Col. Charles T. R. Bohannan of *Counterguerrilla Operations: Lessons from the Philippines*, published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1962.

Col. John F. White, OBE, AAR, gained his most valuable experience in counterinsurgent strategy and tactics during the emergency in Malaya. A graduate of the

Royal Military College of Australia, he had previously served with the Australian Parachute Battalion (1941-1946) and had spent five years as an instructor at the Royal Military College and the Australian Parachute School. He had been a company commander and brigade major during the Korean War (1951-1952). In 1957, following three years in Australia on various instructional and staff duties and a brief tour of duty in Singapore, he assumed command of the Third Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment in Malaya, where for two years he successfully employed a large variety of counterinsurgent techniques against the communist terrorists. In 1960, Col. White attended the US Armed Forces Staff College.

LT. COL. Samuel V. Wilson was concerned with aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency throughout his distinguished military career. An officer in the US infantry (Special Forces qualified), he taught guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia in 1942 and 1943. He then joined the 5307th Composite Unit known as "Merrill's Mauraders," with whom he participated in the North Burma campaign in 1943/1944. He was highly decorated for his part in this campaign, which essential was one of guerrilla tactics and operations. After the war Col Wilson was chosen to undergo training in the army's four-year program for foreign area specialists. His general field of specialization was Russia and his particular area of intensive research was the Soviet partisan movement of World War II. Between 1959 and 1961 he served at Fort Bragg as director of instruction in the US Army Special Warfare School and as a member of the Seventh Special Group (Airborne).

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